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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      HUZHOU CHUANGTAI RONGYUAN
      INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
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      PARTNERSHIP, et al.,
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                     Petitioners,
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                                               21 Cv. 9221 (KPF)
                 V.
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      HUI QIN,
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                     Respondent.
                                               Argument
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                                                New York, N.Y.
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                                                August 17, 2023
                                                3:15 p.m.
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      Before:
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                        HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA,
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
           Attorneys for Petitioners
16
      BY: GEOFFREY R. SANT
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           CAROL LEE
           ANDREW C. SMITH
18
      SEIDEN LAW GROUP LLP
           Attorney for Respondent
19
      BY: JENNIFER H. BLECHER
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           XINTONG ZHANG
           AMIAD M. KUSHNER
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      Also present: SHI FENG, Interpreter (Mandarin)
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1 (In open court; case called) THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for 2 3 the record, starting with the plaintiffs. 4 MR. SANT: Jeffrey Sant for plaintiffs. 5 MS. LEE: Carol Lee for plaintiff. 6 MR. SMITH: Andrew Smith for petitioners. 7 THE COURT: Thank you very much. I understand I will be hearing from Mr. Sant in the 8 9 first instance. Is that correct? 10 MR. SANT: If your Honor permits, we would like to 11 divide up the presentation. Is that okay? 12 THE COURT: It might be. Let me understand, please. 13 Welcome back. 14 MR. ZHANG: I'm sorry, your Honor. I was trying to 15 pick up the translator. She went to the wrong entry. THE COURT: Will I know in advance how the labor has 16 17 been divided or will it just depend on my questions, sir? 18 MR. SANT: If your Honor permits us to do a 19 presentation, we were thinking that I would present on the 20 document spoliation and how that requires a contempt finding. 21 Ms. Lee is ready to present on his refusal to give straight 22 answers in the depositions, which requires an adverse inference 23 finding. And Mr. Smith is ready to present on the relief that 24 we are seeking in general.

THE COURT: I see. I won't immediately reject your

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thoughtful proposal. What I will say is I want you to understand that I have in fact read all of the written materials, so I don't want you to repeat what is said. You can refer to it and say, as I mentioned in our brief, but I don't want you to repeat yourself.

At the back table, you're welcome to introduce yourselves.

MS. BLECHER: Jennifer Blecher for respondent.

MR. ZHANG: Xintong Zhang for respondent.

THE COURT: And Mr. Kushner.

MR. KUSHNER: Amiad Kushner for Mr. Qin.

THE COURT: Ms. Blecher, do I understand you're taking the lead this afternoon or is there a similar division of labor?

MS. BLECHER: There is no division of labor. I will be handling all topics, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Counsel, when we last spoke substantively on this issue, I believe I expressed a concern that I had, or maybe just an issue that I had about the question of my jurisdiction. I am aware that there is in fact an ongoing appeal up at the Second Circuit regarding the --

MS. BLECHER: Our translator, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

THE INTERPRETER: Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will resume.

I was concerned and I wanted to understand the degree to which the pending appeal impacted my ability to hear further motion practice in this case. And having looked at a number of issues and a number of sources, it does appear to me that I do have jurisdiction, and no one here seems to contest that I do. I did want to make sure that I had it, and it would seem to me that I have it because I retain the right, even after the filing of a valid notice of appeal, I retain the right to enforce the judgment if the judgment has not been stayed or superseded. It has not been in either case, and so, therefore, I feel I am comfortable going forward. Once again, I will tell the parties, if you wake up tomorrow and think that I do not have jurisdiction, someone ought to tell me quickly. All of the research that I have done suggests that I have jurisdiction, so I wanted to begin with that.

I also wanted to make sure I understood the state of play in this case, and here's what I mean by that. Based on all of the materials that I have reviewed in preparation for this conference, I am understanding petitioners to be telling me that since my order in April, there has been no, if you will, forward progress with respect to discovery. There has been additional depositions, but there have been no additional documents produced; there has been no additional information provided at the depositions. And what I understand the

respondents to be saying is that Mr. Qin has produced all that he can. So to the extent that there has been no forward progress, as I have described it, in discovery since our last proceeding, since my last order in the case, that is simply because there is nothing else to give.

So perhaps I can begin there. Mr. Sant, do I understand your position correctly?

You are Mr. Sant, correct?

MR. SANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will try that again. The position that I understand you to be saying is, you have gotten nothing of substance since my April order, which is why you have renewed your motion.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, that is correct. In fact, we have created a demonstrative, if your Honor would like to see it, going through each of the 17 categories.

THE COURT: Is that something that was given to me as an exhibit to a prior matter or is it something you prepared for today?

MR. SANT: We prepared it for today. We thought it might be helpful.

THE COURT: I will ask you to pass it to me and also to the folks at the back table if you haven't already done so already. Thank you.

MR. SANT: So, as your Honor can see from the

demonstrative, there were 17 --

THE COURT: Is there an extra copy?

MR. SANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's continue.

MR. SANT: I will just briefly summarize what this shows. Your Honor in the April 18 order set forth 17 categories of documents, which Mr. Qin must produce within three days. He produced no documents whatsoever within those three days. Since then he has only produced a smattering of documents.

And as one can see from looking at the chart, the categories in red are completely unproduced, not a single page has been produced. The categories that have been highlighted in yellow, this is the third column status, are partially outstanding. And the sad thing is that partially in most cases means almost completely outstanding.

The only really significant production that Mr. Qin made was a handful, truly a handful of screenshots of some communications he had with some people.

So if you look at category number 13, Mr. Qin produced six pages of screenshots of messages with all of these different individuals that this Court ordered production for. Six pages of screenshots is on its face absurd.

Then in category number 15, all communications for these different individuals, again, he has produced a handful

of screenshots.

In category number 14, the total number of screenshots was 12 pages of screenshots.

So the production is beyond minimal, your Honor. And everything is completely outstanding.

I would just highlight one item in particular. Mr. Qin produced no new bank records since this Court's April 18 order.

THE COURT: He has indicated that that's because he has been told that he has to go to the physical bank in order to get those records.

MR. SANT: I would be happy to respond to that point directly. But prior to doing so, I would like to point out that the bank account that he produced some records for is the Cathay Bank, which is allegedly still open and which only possesses \$500 as of the November 2022 bank statement that he produced. He has produced no new monthly statements since, despite our request for it. And this is not a bank where he allegedly needs to go to Hong Kong. He produced up to November, but he refuses to produce additional bank records. It is just very confusing why he would not produce those immediately upon the April 18 order.

Turning to your Honor's question, we don't believe at all that he needs to go to Hong Kong to obtain records. There is really no support for it whatsoever. The communications

that were produced by Seiden between Mr. Qin and the banks, the banks say that he can obtain these records by doing a video chat function or other functions. There is a WeChat message, one of the very few that Mr. Qin produced, where one of his assistants says that he tried to collect records from one bank in Hong Kong and wasn't able to do so and says, Mr. Qin, you need to come do it yourself. I don't think that means that he needs to go to Hong Kong. It just means that his friend can't get the records for him.

THE COURT: I was wondering what that meant because I thought that was being offered to me as proof that he needed to go to Hong Kong, whereas I understood it as it might be more convenient for you to show up and do this than to use another method. I didn't see it as a restriction, but I will hear from respondents to tell me if they view it otherwise.

I will let you continue, sir.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, basically, what we are seeking here today is what we think is the minimum necessary relief to force Mr. Qin to comply with this Court's orders and to remedy his spoliation, withholding of records, in violation of this Court's orders.

Rule 37(b)(2)(C) mandates attorneys' fees for any order of contempt. But the reality here, your Honor, is that we all know that's not going to be effective in causing Mr. Qin to comply. This Court already in its April 18 order ordered

monetary sanctions and Mr. Qin did not comply with the April 18 order.

Also, Mr. Qin is not paying a judgment that is half a billion dollars. Any sanctions of attorneys' fees to him is a couple of days of interest on a judgment that he is not paying already. His whole point it seems to be to evade producing records that could allow collection on his judgment. I don't see how the fees can accomplish the goal of getting him to comply.

So that's why we have other relief requested, your Honor. First of all, we ask that this Court order seizure of Mr. Qin's devices. I would point your Honor to paragraph 38 of Qin's July 7 declaration that's attached to their opposition, where he "did not object to petitioners' intention to have a marshal collect it."

So this is not opposed, your Honor. And we brought a forensic specialist with us today, a Mr. Tino Kyprianou from Setec Investigations. He's available to formally collect any devices that Mr. Qin brought with him to court. And to the extent he did not bring devices to court, we would request this Court order the marshals to seize any phones, computers, or electronic devices that are not here today.

Your Honor kindly permitted me to summarize some of the key points in our briefs, and I will try to be very brief, as your Honor requested. If any of us were to try to present

in a lecture, for example, the perfect example of a case requiring a contempt, or meriting a contempt finding, we might come up with what is before us today, which is: The Court has already found respondent violated the Court's clear orders; the Court has already found contempt was warranted but gave respondent another chance; respondent produced no new documents by this Court's deadline; respondent instead destroyed the very records this Court ordered produced; respondent has not paid a penny of a half billion dollar judgment, despite living in multiple penthouses and Long Island mansions; and this Court already found his claim of poverty "defies belief."

Those are the facts here. This Court ordered, as I mentioned, Mr. Qin to produce documents within three days. He produced no documents within three days. And that alone, if there was nothing else that happened, that alone merits contempt.

I will briefly respond to opposing counsel. They said that the April 18 order was merely requiring some kind of response by the 21st.

THE COURT: No, it was not.

MR. SANT: Then I will skip any other comments on that.

On page 10, line 16 to 20 of the April 18 order, this Court ordered production of "information about bank accounts, credit cards, and trusts controlled by respondent, as well as

documentation of his income, property, and vehicles." Again, bank accounts, credit cards, and trusts, income and vehicles.

THE COURT: Sir, I hate to go back, but I am going to have to go back. Could you tell me, please, again where the citation that you read to me regarding the devices is located. It took me a moment to pull up the opposition in this case.

MR. SANT: It's in Mr. Qin's declaration.

THE COURT: What paragraph, please?

MR. SANT: Paragraph 38.

THE COURT: Thank you so much.

MR. SANT: He says that we know where the devices are located, which I assume he means his home. And he invites the marshals to collect it. The exact quote by Mr. Qin is "did not object to petitioners' intention to have the marshal collect it."

THE COURT: What I am understanding this to be, sir, I am understanding that, at some point in the past, Mr. Qin said to you, and it looks to be at his deposition that he said, here's where the phone is and you can have the marshal collect it, which is different than saying he brought it today and he's willing to give it up. I think I am reading that correctly. Yes, sir?

MR. SANT: Your Honor is correct. Obviously, we have no ability to order the marshals to do anything. That's why we are here today. We are asking your Honor to order the marshals

to take the actions that Mr. Qin himself invited.

If I may continue. I just quoted from the April 18 order. The topics were bank accounts, credit cards, and trusts, income and vehicles. Those were all your Honor's enumerated categories of documents, and Mr. Qin produced no new documents in any of these categories; not just by the 21st, but in the four months since this Court's order. No new bank accounts, no credit cards, no trust information, no income, no vehicles.

Mr. Qin has destroyed more than he has produced in each of these categories. Qin was given three days to produce all records, but he hasn't done it in four months.

Qin testified to receiving 300 million Hong Kong dollars in three separate bank accounts. And, sadly, it doesn't surprise us that those are the three bank accounts, or among the bank accounts that he has not produced any records for whatsoever.

In many cases, Mr. Qin and his counsel did not even seek records until after our January 9 premotion conference letter, and in some cases even after this Court's April 18 order. I will direct the Court's attention to writing the banks in January after the premotion conference letter, and Qin e-mails his immigration counsel on April 28, a week after this Court's deadline for production.

Worse, Qin deleted and destroyed the very records this

Court ordered produced up to and through the deadlines set by this Court. This doesn't just merit contempt, it frankly is contempt.

Mr. Qin spent a lot of time in his brief arguing that he has some kind of justifications for destroying records.

THE COURT: Well, there are a couple of arguments that are being made, and I am wondering, sir, whether you would like to address them now in this portion of the hearing or whether you want to let them be articulated by the defense before you respond to them.

For example, there is a suggestion that what you should have done was to try and seize assets that were available, that you should have taken efforts to get materials and information from third parties, including the third parties whose names you sought, things of that nature. There is a suggestion that there is more that you could have done, and yet there is almost -- and I am using this term colloquially -- there is almost an exhaustion requirement before you can come in and seek contempt. So I would like you to speak about that.

Also, and, candidly, to my recollection for the first time, there seems to be the introduction of information about your clients' ties or not to the Chinese Communist Party.

Again, I don't remember hearing about this at any point in the past two years until now, but if you would like to speak to any of those issues, I will hear from you now.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, I don't think that these are worth responding to.

THE COURT: Okay. Then don't. I am not going to make you.

MR. SANT: If the Court has any concerns, we are happy to respond, of course, and we will be guided by the Court's directions.

The Court already pointed out just a moment ago that your Honor didn't hear any reference to the supposed Communist Party issue until now that this motion has been filed for contempt, and that says everything already. This is an eleventh-hour Hail Mary attempt to distract attention from his own misconduct.

THE COURT: I don't mean to chuckle, sir. I am just trying to figure out how many metaphors you can string together, the eleventh-hour Hail Mary.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, as we pointed out in our brief, this idea that he is afraid of China or that he is afraid of Hong Kong makes no sense. Before he came up with this new argument, in his deposition testimony he repeatedly talked about all his ties and importance in China; how he has important contacts, he can influence people. He talked about how he wished he had invested in Hong Kong real estate. If he is afraid to go to Hong Kong, these make no sense, these comments and statements that he made when he was filibustering

during his deposition testimony. It is simply something that he has come up with now to try to distract the Court's attention, and I think it's quite transparent. But if the Court has any concerns, we will be happy to answer anything that the Court wants to know.

THE COURT: I appreciate the fact that you are letting me set your oral argument. I'm not sure that's the wisest move.

Earlier you said that one of the things you wanted was the seizure of his devices. I wrote number 1 next to it, assuming that there would be a number 2 and a number 3 coming on. You're not asking -- well, you are asking for attorneys' fees, and I understand why. I am not giving them to you just yet, but I understand why. You're not asking, as I understand it, for monetary sanctions. Your view is that they simply would not be coercive.

You want me to jail the man. And you want me to take certain facts in your favor. Do I understand that correctly?

MR. SANT: Your Honor, I agree, but I would put a twist on it. We don't actually want him to be incarcerated. What we would like for him to do is to comply with this Court's orders.

THE COURT: Okay. Among the things you have told me I can do is to detain the man. So I assume you're telling me that because that is in fact what you want. If you don't want

that, if what you really just want are these factual findings, then tell me. I just want to know, as I am getting all of this information, as I prepare to speak to the back table, what is it that you want today from me.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, we have actually prepared a draft order, if your Honor would be willing to review it, which lays out exactly what we are seeking, but I can let your Honor know orally as well.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. SANT: First, it's mandatory that if the Court rules that Mr. Qin is in contempt, then there would be attorneys' fees. In addition, we would like to have his electronic devices, including his phones, seized so they can be forensically imaged and we can attempt to recover the information that Mr. Qin deleted and destroyed.

We ask that this Court incarcerate Mr. Qin until he complies with this Court's April 18 order, which set forth the documents that he must produce. And until he complies with this Court's April 18 order, and this Court's other orders, then he can be released.

We would be happy to set a status conference quickly after incarceration. We are not looking to have him stay incarcerated. What we would like to do is to force him to comply, which he clearly will not do --

THE COURT: According to his deposition testimony,

there is some suggestion at least, and it may be puffery, even jail is not going to make him. I can shoot him and it wouldn't cause him to comply.

No, gentlemen, I am not asking you to do that.

So you are seeking incarceration.

MR. SANT: Yes, your Honor, until he complies.

THE COURT: If I may, just because I want to be sure I understand the requests.

You're asking me to take certain things as given, to find certain facts in your favor. If I do that, why do you need the incarceration? Also, if I do that, what are you going to do with them? And I am not saying that to be facetious. Is it the basis for a turnover petition that you would be making? Is it the basis for some sort of asset seizure? What happens if there is a third party who holds a different view and has this information? I am just trying to understand where we are going from today. I know what happens with detention. I know how that works. I am not sure I know what happens with respect to the factual findings you're asking me to make.

MR. SANT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will wait for him. That's fine. Just know, everybody at the front table, someone is going to have to tell me that story, because I do want to understand.

Are there other things you would like me to know, sir, before you turn over the reins to somebody else at your table?

MR. SANT: I think at this point, your Honor, if you permit, I will allow my colleague, Carol Lee, to discuss the deposition testimony and why that also requires adverse inferences.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Lee.

MS. LEE: Your Honor, besides the document spoliation, Qin also violated this Court's order compelling his deposition and requiring him to answer all questions. Mr. Qin's recalcitrance and lack of cooperation further supports an order of civil contempt and findings of adverse inferences. He claims that he has sat for over 20 hours of deposition testimony. But as this Court knows, at his deposition he refused to answer questions. He filibustered and he gave conflicting answers to questions that he did answer.

So, we are not getting any answers to the most basic questions, such as where he lives, despite his claiming that he has sat for so many hours at depositions. We are also not getting any information as to where he got all this money to pay for his lavish lifestyle.

THE COURT: Is that really the question that you wish to ask? You have a judgment, you wish to have assets to satisfy the judgment. I would think your focus is simply on

what assets does he have today and what assets -- and I am not saying this happened -- he may have had but transferred to other people. Is that correct?

MS. LEE: That's exactly correct, your Honor. We have been trying to get that information from Mr. Qin, but we are not getting any answers from him whatsoever at his depositions.

So, basically, his depositions created more questions than answers. And because he has not been forthcoming with his knowledge about various entities with which he associated, we can only assume that the various dealings involving those entities are a sham.

THE COURT: Well, that is what you are asking me to find. I am not sure I am there.

I am correct, am I not, that his wife or former wife, for ease of reference I am calling her his wife, is going to be deposed in the month of October? Is that correct?

MS. LEE: We have ordered her deposition to happen before October 5, and currently we don't have a set date for her because of her supposed travel to Europe.

THE COURT: My question is, do you believe that there is any utility in waiting until her deposition? Because I was told, for example, that she may be in possession of certain immigration records. Should I wait to hear what she has to say, and if you believe not, tell me why.

MS. LEE: Your Honor, we believe we don't have to wait

for her deposition because she is not -- we served a document subpoena on her more than two months ago, and as of today we still have not received a single page of documents from her.

THE COURT: You have not received documents. Have you received objections from her attorney?

MS. LEE: We have received written responses and her responses have represented that she will be producing the documents by mid-July, so that was already a month and a half ago, and as of today we still have not received a single page of documents.

THE COURT: When was the last time anyone at the front table had a conversation with the wife or her counsel regarding the production of documents?

MS. LEE: If the Court permits, I will let Mr. Smith answer this question.

THE COURT: Yes. I just wondered if anyone reached out to counsel after mid-July to say where are these documents.

MR. SMITH: Yes, your Honor, we did. We spoke with Angus Lee who represents Ms. Liu. Shortly after your Honor temporarily postponed her scheduled deposition that had been ordered and then postponed, we said nothing, well, nothing in that order stops the necessity for producing documents under the document subpoena. After that they said that they would be planning to assert the same grounds upon which they asserted in sealed submissions to your Honor, so we are not privy to them,

in terms of refusing to produce documents. We said that that was not appropriate, and followed up recently and have said, now that the deposition has been scheduled, and no relief has been sought or granted with respect to the documents, that they should produce the documents immediately.

In fact, just this week we have had a series of back-and-forths with Mr. Ni, and we have told him that if he does not produce documents, we will have to unfortunately bring a motion to compel, which you may see. He has represented to us that he needs more time. He has not said categorically, and that's why it has been difficult, in terms of coming to your Honor to seek relief, because we have been getting a bit of back-and-forth from him saying, well, we are not sure what we are going to do, I need to consult with her other lawyers.

In fact, one of the last communications we received from Ms. Liu's counsel said, well, her deposition isn't going to take place until early October so we have plenty of time. And we responded and made clear, No, these documents are already a month and a half overdue; we refuse to wait for another month and a half. And that communication was from us, I believe yesterday, and still unresponded. So you likely will see a motion from us with respect to that.

So, to answer your question that you posed to my colleague, should we wait to hear from Ms. Liu, well, we believe that we are going to be getting the same thing, and we

don't want to wait until October, to then not have documents, to have evasive answers. They have already provided conflicting information through either informal or communications such as her responses to the document requests. For instance, she says that Mr. Qin did in fact create these trusts and has the documents. He says, she should have the documents. So we expect that she is going to say, I don't have the documents.

THE COURT: But there also has been a suggestion, even if they had responsive documents, you're not getting them because they are going to assert the same grounds that were asserted to me in an ex parte submission.

MR. SMITH: That's exactly right. The mere fact that you have allowed the deposition to go forward does not mean that we are going to hear "take five" after every question, or plead the Fifth.

So we don't know what we will get from her. So that's a more fulsome response to why this Court should not wait.

THE COURT: Just so I understand, there is a little bit of a stalemate here, correct? Ms. Liu's counsel is saying, well, we were not sure we had to produce anything, but we are not moving to quash. And your view is, there needs to be production. Each of you thinks the other needs to make an application to me.

MR. SMITH: Correct with one caveat. We have said,

either confirm you are going to produce or we will file this motion. So you will get a motion from us. We are not satisfied with that stalemate. We obviously were preoccupied a bit with this application.

THE COURT: Also fair. It sounds like you're telling me that another reason why it's not worth waiting is that you can wait until her deposition, you're not getting any documents, you may not get any answers either.

MR. SMITH: Correct.

And also, your Honor, documents that we believe that she has that we want to get are not the full universe of documents. For instance, we don't expect her to produce the Cathay Bank records, which we know he has. Again, that is documents that we have not received. The last document we received in that bank account was in November. And during our April 20 meet-and-confer with counsel, we made clear that we were requesting up-to-date documents from the Cathay Bank. So they can't come here and say, we didn't know you wanted us to refresh that. That has been expressly communicated to counsel and still we have heard nothing. There is no reason why. He should be able to produce those this afternoon.

Coming back to -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: It's fine if there is something else you want to tell me. At some point I am going back to Ms. Lee, correct?

MS. LEE: I will turn it over to Mr. Smith.

THE COURT: I will hear from whoever has the information.

Mr. Smith, please continue.

MR. SMITH: I wanted to address the issue that you had raised with respect to, well, if I grant you adverse inferences, then you don't need incarceration, or vice versa.

THE COURT: I have folks here who at least can facilitate the process of detention. It's just a question of whether I ask them to or not.

MR. SMITH: And the reason we are asking for both is this. We know that he has destroyed documents, and we believe that those documents would be favorable to us, and therefore we are entitled to an adverse inference. And we know that he has not produced documents that would be helpful to us, but he is not going to produce them. So your granting adverse inferences to us today will not help us get that additional information which will be helpful to enforce our judgment.

So, there are two sets of relief, but they are not mutually exclusive. They are actually specifically fashioned to address two different types of issues. And that's why we think incarceration is really the only way that we will get him to turn over documents and information that there is no reason why he should not have produced to date. We know that they exist. And in certain cases we know they exist because he has

denied having certain information in written responses to discovery requests, and then we discover at his deposition that he does have -- for instance, had an aircraft or current cars that he owns in China. These are all things that up until one of his more recent depositions he was saying he has no records with respect to because he doesn't have any of those things. Well, now we know he does. And the only way to get him to comply with your order is incarceration. Monetary damages doesn't mean anything to him.

THE COURT: Just on the point of destroying documents, obviously, those are very serious allegations, and I remember there has been a discussion about destruction of phones, repeated destruction of phones, and I guess that is one area.

I know there was a rather inflammatory video -- pardon the pun -- of lighting money on fire.

I want to make sure I understand the basis for your claim that he has destroyed documents. Is it the WeChat images that he has deleted?

MR. SMITH: It is his own testimony. And we have multiple examples.

THE COURT: Let me hear what you believe has been destroyed. Again, there is some suggestion from the defense that maybe these things have been overstated, maybe there are statements — for example, the destruction of a phone doesn't necessarily destroy all of the information within the phone.

MR. SMITH: Correct. We heard for the first time that the documents that they actually produced to us were off of the damaged phone, in the opposition to contempt. It really doesn't matter which phone he gets it off of. We just want the information.

So we were reporting what he testified to. In response to our questions about information that he may have on a phone, his response was, I smashed that phone. It's a reasonable inference that we thought he was saying that he had destroyed that device. Then he said he had it. So we still want information off that. That's not the basis for the destruction. It's the actual deletion of the e-mails.

Your Honor referenced their attempt to downplay the significance of what they have and have not produced. Frankly, I think that we have downplayed the significance. Because he has an e-mail address. We have not received a single e-mail. He has testified that three of his assistants have access to this e-mail account. We have not received any communications that they sent using this e-mail account on his behalf or anything else.

THE COURT: He has an e-mail address from which you have received not one single e-mail?

MR. SMITH: Not one single e-mail.

THE COURT: And it's an e-mail that his assistants have access to? When you say that, do you mean that his

assistants contact him at that e-mail address or that they are able to send e-mails under that e-mail address?

MR. SMITH: If they have access to it, I assume that they send e-mails on his behalf. And it's his testimony that we are relying on. So we asked him about his e-mail address. Why haven't you produced e-mails? I don't have a computer. I don't use it. Why do you have an e-mail address? My assistants use the e-mail address. Which assistants use it? He identified three.

By the way, your Honor, this is all detailed in appendix 3, and why we think that there is an adverse inference, who these people are, what they have access to; and, notably, this was essentially not addressed or referenced in their opposition, tellingly I would add. But if you turn to page 3 of that, it's appendix 3 to the Carol Lee declaration. It's at ECF 176-14.

So, on page 3, we have an excerpt there in support of this. This is his -- actually, it was in his supplemental declaration. So it was a written response. And he says, "To clarify, I do have an e-mail address." And he lists his e-mail address. "To the best of my knowledge, Shirley Wen, Kevin Wong, and Yong Zhang have access to my e-mail account." And I believe there is also testimony, too, that my colleague has found.

MR. SANT: If the Court would like to hear, I can read

the deposition testimony.

THE COURT: It's not necessary. Thank you.

MR. SMITH: So, your Honor, getting back to the point that I am trying to make, they say this is all irrelevant, what does it matter that he deleted some WeChat communications with people that he calls assistants, but really they are just friends because he doesn't pay them, the same way that he doesn't have any money. These people arrange for his hotel rooms and arrange for other things. One of the friends or assistants that they produced, it's either four or one page. Either way, this is the person that he was communicating with respect to tax returns. Also, there was another one where he sent his consulting agreement to them.

So, the whole universe of communications that we have received is set forth in a chart in paragraph 38 of the Lee declaration. And it's ten pages from one person, four pages, two pages, and then a single page from three other people, two of which are his assistants. Not a single e-mail and a spattering of this. And just to be clear, we asked for communications over a five-year period. So he didn't delete a communication here and a communication there. And these are screenshot as well.

So, the reason that we know he deleted information is because he told us that. We assumed that he deleted something. But I don't think he deleted everything except for these three

things. That's why we want the devices seized and be scanned, not only to see if they can recover any deleted information, but also to see if there are communications that haven't been produced yet that would otherwise be responsive. Because the representation that they make that he deleted a few, what he characterizes as irrelevant communications doesn't make sense when he produces one page from a person that is his assistant, that has access to his e-mail account, that deals with his taxes, that he communicated with him with regard to his consulting agreement, and there is only one page. He deleted them all.

So, that's my response to their argument that we are overstating this. I think we are understating the complete derth of any real information that has been produced to us.

They also argue that simply because these assistants have access to his e-mail account does not mean that they would likely communicate, quote, regarding Qin's financial situation and major transactions. This is at page 24 of their opposition. But that begs the question: Then who does? Somebody has to. Mr. Qin doesn't go through life for the last five years doing big business transactions without some communications related to those assets and transactions and his holdings. We have nothing. And we know it's either out there or he has deleted it. And the two major remedies that we are seeking address both of those.

THE COURT: Let me speak with Ms. Blecher. Thank you very much.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, would you just like me to begin?

THE COURT: Please. And if it's easier to speak from the podium, you're welcome to do so.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, maybe the best place to start is where your Honor started, which is to give you the current posture with respect to respondent's position.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BLECHER: I don't want to say that the position is that there is nothing else possible that could ever be produced. There are questions here regarding who has possession of the relevant documents, what exists, and to what extent that Mr. Qin, who has been trying diligently to obtain materials from certain third parties, is able to come into possession. If that's the case, he would be very happy to produce them.

Just to touch on a few specific items. With respect to the Cathay Bank account, that account is still open. I guess I will just fall on my sword for more recent monthly statements. Mr. Qin has no objection to producing those.

THE COURT: Then why are we here? How difficult could it be? Are you suggesting, for example, that petitioners didn't tell you they wanted up-to-date statements? I find that

difficult to believe given the ferocity in which they have reached out to me. It would be very shocking if you said I didn't know until today that they wanted more recent statements.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, what I would say is that there had been an earlier production, and I think that in the briefing and the discussion of numerous items that were at issue in the first motion, that were requested in the supplemental requests, that there was a lot of focus on a lot of items that had not been produced and that Mr. Qin could not get access to that we were trying to get access to. And with respect to the Cathay Bank statements, that is the one account that remains open, there was just an oversight in terms of bringing it up to date for those additional three months.

THE COURT: I guess why I find that so difficult to believe is that you're being effectively besieged by petitioners' counsel. They are filing all of these motions. They are asking for your client to be remanded today at the end of this proceeding. And I would have thought that if a lot of your answers were, we don't really know what information there is, and we can't go to China to get this information, we can't go to Hong Kong to get this information, or this is information in the possession of an estranged wife and we can't get it from her, you have the banks records, I would have thought you would have at least tried to make a good faith showing, here are bank

records. We don't have them. You haven't produced them. I just find it difficult to believe that you would sit on actual responsive documents, but we are here.

I also don't find especially satisfactory this idea that there are questions regarding who has possession regarding what exists and regarding what extent your client can have access to these documents. We have been discussing this since the beginning of the year. We had a full-throated, complete discussion about this in April, and there is nothing but excuses. So I find it impossible to believe that folks who didn't know until after my April order, which used words like "contempt," that actually your client didn't have the ability to access these materials. So please tell me why I should not be as skeptical as I currently am about the opposition submission.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, there are a lot of categories of documents at issue, and I was trying to address the simple ones first. There are documents, such as the documents from the banks in Hong Kong. Those accounts were closed by the banks. They were not closed by Mr. Qin. And he tried to reach out and obtain those documents. There has been a big point of contention in this case regarding Mr. Qin's use of the word "assistant." He has provided testimony numerous times that these people, he refers to them as assistants because they are people who are helping him with various

things.

THE COURT: I have also seen the petitioners' responsive reply challenging the lost-in-translation argument you're now making to me.

Let me ask this question. Right now today how much money is in the Cathay Bank account? Is it \$500?

MS. BLECHER: I don't have possession of the statement at the moment.

THE COURT: You must have seen it at some point.

MS. BLECHER: I actually have not, your Honor. The point is, the discussion I had earlier with Mr. Qin is, we have to continue to update that production and can you give us those bank statements so that we can update it, and he has no problem with doing that.

THE COURT: Please speak to your client and find out how much money today is in the Cathay Bank account. You can walk right over to him.

MS. BLECHER: Mr. Zhang will have to do it because I do not speak Chinese.

THE COURT: Someone do it.

THE DEFENDANT: A few thousand dollars. I have not used this account for so long.

THE COURT: In November of 2022 there was approximately \$500. There is now a few thousand dollars in that account?

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THE DEFENDANT: A few months ago I was paid a fee 1 ending a contract and release me. That's the last payment. 2 3 THE COURT: He received a payment to complete a 4 contract or to release him from a contract? 5 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, release him, like break off the 6 contract. 7 THE COURT: I see. Approximately how much was that payment? 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: They deduct from the credit card they 10 give to me that I spend over the limit. After that deduction, 11 probably a few thousand dollars. 12 THE COURT: I am not sure what was just said. You're 13 saying a credit card debt was paid, and then in addition to 14 that there was several thousand dollars? THE DEFENDANT: So we end the contract at that time 15 16 and they gave me a consulting fee, but they deduct the amount 17 that I spent over the limit of the company credit card 18 allowance, and there is a remaining few thousand dollars and 19 that was the amount that was passed into the account. 20 THE COURT: How much was the consulting fee and how 21 much was the overage on the credit card? 22 THE DEFENDANT: They pay me a consulting fee about a 23 little bit over \$4,000 per month. And the reason for 24 overspending on the credit card limit is because there was some

important clients coming domestically from China, and we had

two to three meals and probably spend about, like, \$10,000, and that was over the limit.

THE COURT: Did you say \$4,000 per month on the consulting fee or a different number than that? I wanted to make sure I heard you correctly.

THE DEFENDANT: 4,000 per month.

THE COURT: I see. So now, what is left from the payment for the termination of that contract is at the Cathay Bank account?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. And I only have this one bank account.

THE COURT: That's all the money he has in the world, all of the cash to which he has access in the whole world?

THE DEFENDANT: Today, yeah. And all the other accounts were closed.

THE COURT: Ms. Blecher, how is your client living?

Please don't tell me on the terminated \$4,000 on the consultancy agreement.

MS. BLECHER: The consultancy fee was discussed during Mr. Qin's deposition. There seems to be, based on the way that petitioners have copied or spliced a lot of his testimony, Mr. Qin has testified consistently during his deposition that he does not have an address. Instead, I do believe it is contested that he comes from a background where, at least at one point, he was very politically well connected in China. Of

course, he used to have quite a bit of money, and during that time he developed relationships with various individuals in China and elsewhere. And since he has fallen on hard times financially, he has testified that it's effectively a situation where he is kind of bouncing from place to place to place, sometimes it's with a friend who lives on the Upper East Side, there is a friend who lives in Battery Park, there is a friend who lives in Flushing. This was the subject of deposition testimony.

THE COURT: Please understand I have read the deposition testimony. I just find it incredible. There was some suggestion at some earlier point in this case that he had some ownership interest in these properties. Now I am told that he is living on the kindness of strangers, or the kindness of friends. I find that just so difficult to believe.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, I think that it's important to take into account, I certainly don't have a relevant background in certain of the circles that Mr. Qin -- the cultural background, and I certainly don't have friends that have the kind of resources that Mr. Qin has. So it may seem that being destitute, when you have a lot of wealthy friends, is obviously not as rough of a situation as it would be for a lot of us, including me, if I were to find myself in that situation. Some of these people are friends. He also does have children who live in a house on Long Island.

THE COURT: But he tells me he visits his wife, but he doesn't have the temerity to ask her for the documents that she is keeping at that house. That makes no sense to me either.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, Mr. Qin has asked her on certain occasions for the documents. To be clear, it's a very large property and Mr. Qin testified that he does not stay in the main house. He typically stays out by the pool or in the sauna. So these materials are in the house, and petitioners' counsel had even suggested that because he might be able to go inside the house and grab documents, that this would somehow be considered a practical ability to access for discovery purposes. Ms. Liu has had some serious health issues in recent time, and so he definitely has stated during deposition that there have been occasions where, because of these health issues, or because of particular flare-ups in interpersonal problems, he did not want to ask her at that particular time but will try to ask her again.

On the whole, and for better or for worse, Mr. Qin just engaged in a real-time practice in the conduct of his financial affairs that was not subject to detailed record keeping, was not especially sophisticated, was done via a lot of informal oral arrangements. It appears to be the case that Ms. Liu is the opposite in that regard. She seems to have quite a few documents, and that kind of left Mr. Qin in a frustrating position because he wants to comply with the

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Court's order and he wants to provide all the responsive information that he has.

He did used to have quite a large number of assets.

As your Honor is no doubt aware, he kind of got looped into an award that really was a contractual dispute between his company and petitioners. He ended up on the hook for that and he has since been under a deluge of creditors. The underlying award in this case is not the only legal issue that befell his company.

So he has been under a deluge of judgment creditors. He had to dispose of the assets. Mr. Qin submitted a declaration on this earlier in the case. The vast majority of his net worth was tied up in the stock ownership of these companies. He did receive significant dividends in 2017 and 2018, which petitioners referred to earlier, these hundreds of millions of Hong Kong dollars that he had, and he did freely spend that money during that time. And he did testify that he had to get rid of a lot of the things that he bought, including the plane and the boat, because he had stock that was worth a lot of money, and then the assets of his company, he has testified, or he has stated in the declaration, and argued this in the arbitration proceeding, that somebody who worked for petitioners caused the value producing assets of his company to be stripped from his company, leaving him with a shell entity that was worthless. And then that same petitioner showed up

and asked to have shares bought back that were worthless because all the movie theaters that were owned by his company had been effectively stolen from the company.

THE COURT: That was an argument rejected by the arbitrators.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, I believe the reason the arbitrators rejected that argument was because it concerned the parent company who was not a party to the proceeding.

Certainly we are not here to relitigate the subject matter of the proceedings. It's not an appropriate basis for revisiting it. I only bring it up because the point there is, what assets does Mr. Qin have and what records does he have? And petitioners have continued to point to the fact that at one point he did have a significant amount of money to paint him as someone who is very financially sophisticated, and someone who must therefore be hiding assets and documents, and must have all these records, when the reality is that Mr. Qin does not.

He testified to this during deposition, that he does not have a lot of education. He grew up in a military family and he married into a government family, developed political connections, which kind of put him on a path to amassing for some time a large amount of wealth. But that did not bring with it a financial sophistication or the sudden sense to start keeping detailed financial records, or even doing things like having contracts translated into Chinese before he signed them.

So the way that petitioners have described --

THE COURT: The problem with what you're saying to me is, first of all, that you preface a lot of the facts by saying "respondent has testified," which doesn't necessarily mean that is the fact. When you read the deposition in its totality, it is internally inconsistent, and not all of that can be ascribed to problems with the translation.

The difficulty that I have is that your client said to me in a conference that, now that he understood my orders, he would abide by them, but then he didn't. Your client has said a number of things, but then they just haven't come true. And it is also distressing to get new arguments in connection with the opposition that I have never heard in two years of having the case. So I am trying very hard to listen to the arguments that you're making to me, but they seem at times outweighed or undermined by the very statements your client has made at his deposition.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, I do believe that there are some translation issues. Again, I do not speak Chinese, but that's my understanding, is that some things either got lost in translation — not because the translation was bad, but because of the way Mr. Qin talks may not be — or the background that he comes from when he is talking about certain things do not necessarily translate.

For example, I had mentioned earlier, your Honor, the

issue of the word "assistant." And you mentioned in the reply, I guess it's an expert affirmation. Again, I am not in a position to comment on the linguistics of the word, which I believe is *zhuli*. But the issue here is not the linguistics. The issue is, what does Mr. Qin mean when he uses a particular word and what are the facts? The individuals that he describes as assistants throughout his deposition —

THE COURT: One moment, please. I am asking your client to turn the microphone away so I don't hear the simultaneous translation.

Please continue.

MS. BLECHER: He described a number of individuals; they were the subject of one of the attachments for information to the original sanctions motion. Individuals that are identified as assistants include a 77-year-old man who owns a series of nightclubs in Singapore. There was another businessman who owns a jewelry store. Petitioners claim there must be responsive information from Ali Weng, because Ali Weng communicated with investors in the Lido nightclub. One of those investors was Ali Weng. These are people who have significant means and their own businesses. And whether it's consistent with proper linguistic practice or not, when Mr. Qin is using that word, what he is trying to say is, I need help with a certain thing and there are people who I can trust to reach out to who will help me with a particular issue.

So, the idea that these people are paid assistants, or employees of Mr. Qin, that are somehow hiding information, or that would be in possession of all of this financial transaction information that petitioners believe exist, based I am not really sure on what, they just assume that it must because he had significant assets at one point, these people are not his employees. Again, they are friends.

And I certainly do not run in circles where I can get the kind of help that Mr. Qin has stated that he is able to get, but I also do not have the background, the political connections, and I certainly haven't spent the last 20 years giving money or helping people out with various situations. So when Mr. Qin is saying that he has developed these relationships that allow him to ask somebody, can I stay at your house, or can you help me get dinner, or can you foot the bill for a hotel, it may not seem realistic to a lot of people, but he did consistently testify about these things.

And to the extent there are issues with consistency in the transcripts, I will say the January 30 deposition and the April 24 deposition were almost exactly the same, in terms of the questions and subject matters that were covered, to the point that at one point Mr. Qin said, you asked me this last time, you asked me this last time, and petitioners' counsel said, well, I am just checking to make sure what you said was accurate. And the answers were the same from deposition to

deposition.

So, for the most part, the statements that Mr. Qin made with respect to who lent him money on a particular occasion, who he had a phone conversation with, stayed the same. The discrepancies that petitioners have pointed out include things like the fact that Mr. Qin said at one point, I don't have someone's contact information, and at the deposition he pulls out his phone and he has the contact information.

There are two reasons why that is the case. The first is that there were a handful of instances where Mr. Qin actually went out of his way to ask a mutual friend for the contact information of someone he did not have it for so that he could do a better job of complying with your Honor's order.

The other reason, and this is also a misstatement that petitioners make in their papers, is Mr. Qin did say at his deposition on a handful of occasions, I don't remember this person's name. And what he was saying in each of those excerpts is that in Chinese, or at least with the people that Mr. Qin interacts with, it's common to use honorifics or diminutives, such as boss, president, or this word xiao, which I understand means little, to use that before someone's name. And so you refer to someone as Boss Cao or Boss Han instead of by their first name. So when he sees a name like Cao Ging, he doesn't immediately recognize that Cao Ging is the same person that he knows as Boss Cao.

So, at his deposition he says, I don't recognize, I forget this person's first name, but he knows who is being spoken about, but he may not have recognized the name on petitioners' request, and he may not have had the same name on his phone when he's looking for a person's name. So there were a handful of instances where it became clear to him during the deposition, based on context, Oh, the person I thought was Boss Cao is actually Cao Ging. And now he is able to look at his phone and provide that information. And he did take his phone out numerous times during the deposition, and he was handed a piece of paper and he wrote down all the contact information for these various individuals.

So, things like this that are described as discrepancies between his interrogatory responses, or between one day of testimony and the next, are actually reflecting a change in the information that he has or in his understanding of the information that's being sought.

THE COURT: Let's talk, please, about the issue of document destruction.

According to petitioners, your client has admitted to deleting WeChat messages and e-mails. Is that true?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, in the abstract, he has deleted in his lifetime WeChats.

THE COURT: Including after this case was filed.

MS. BLECHER: After this case was filed, Mr. Qin did

delete texts involving this individual Coco Jeung who was raised — he was messengering with her during the January 30 deposition. It was a personal matter, and he apparently was embarrassed by the nature of her work or something that she had done, and he deleted her completely from his phone because he didn't want to interact with her anymore. So he did do that, that did take place, he testified, a few days after the January 30 deposition. So it did not occur after the issuance of this Court's order. It did not happen after the written demand from petitioners for that information.

Overall, however, there is an issue, when you're dealing with spoliation, alleged spoliation and destruction of evidence, with respect to whether there is an obligation at the time the documents are destroyed. So what Mr. Qin testified to is that throughout his life he has not necessarily maintained all the chats that people send him, or text messages that people may send him on a given occasion.

He did testify that in May 2022, he had an issue that I believe involved something that he understood to be that the CCP had hacked his phone, or he believed that something strange had happened to his phone, and there was also news regarding a relative of his that was sentenced to death in China, and so he stopped using WeChat. He had deleted messages and stopped using WeChat because my understanding is that the Chinese government monitors it and he did not want to be communicating

with them over that app.

He did also say, though, as a general matter, and consistent with his practice historically, he doesn't do a ton of texting to begin with. He said that he does a lot of communication by phone; and particularly since May 2022, that he was trying to do all of his communication by phone because he did not want his messages being tracked.

And so, when your Honor issues an order saying, produce all these chats, there is a question of how many existed in the first place, but some have long been deleted for reasons completely unrelated to the litigation. The Coco Jeung texts are their own issue, and Mr. Qin had his own personal reasons for doing that. And surely it's questionable why a person he was trying to have dinner with on a given night is relevant to the litigation.

THE COURT: By the same token, it was so important that he had to actually, in the middle of the deposition -- and please don't say during a break -- when the deposition resumed, he had to engage in communications with her and then the deletion of those communications. You can say it's not relevant. I wonder why it was relevant enough that he interrupted his deposition to do it.

But you're saying, since this litigation was filed, the only messages he has deleted are related to Coco Jeung?

MS. BLECHER: Coco Jeung is the individual. That is

my understanding.

Petitioners have repeatedly invoked this smashed phone. And Mr. Qin testified, and I can read the testimony, that the phone was still intact, you could still download data off of it, and that it was not damaged. That's at 665, from 20-25. He said, "This is the only method I can use in the United States. However, I can download information from the phone that I smashed. It was just a little smashed. It wasn't, like, destruction of the phone."

THE COURT: So when he said several hundred pages earlier, "I probably misspoke yesterday. I threw it away. I smashed it. I have a habit of smashing my phone. I think I have probably smashed more than ten phones in my entire life. I smashed the phone, after my first deposition, of course," what do I make of that?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, I believe it's the same phone that's being discussed. He believed it had been hacked and he threw it at the wall. He said he was suddenly unable to make outgoing calls. He thought it was just tied to some CCP monitoring of the phone.

THE COURT: But there is disconnect. You have been telling me that smashing the phone was a reaction to his concern about it being hacked, but I shouldn't worry because he is able to access everything in any event despite the phone being smashed. I am not sure which it is.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, it depends on what the
question is. If we are dealing with an issue of spoliation of
evidence, there was no spoliation of evidence. If the issue is
the contempt and the noncompliance with an order, the
destruction of the phone did predate the smashing of the
phone did predate your Honor's order. He did testify that he
did it about two months prior to the April 24 deposition. And
he also testified that he understood the importance of the
Court's order, and that he would adhere to it, and that he
would not as counsel explained this to him as well, that
because there had now been a court order, that he had to take
it more seriously, and not just in a fit of anger or
frustration throw the phone in a way that might cause damage to
it. But for spoliation purposes, there is no indication that
what he did was designed or done with the intent to remove
information or take information out of petitioners' hands. At
most, it's irresponsible or just something done out of
frustration, but the evidence was not destroyed, the evidence
was not lost based on the physical action of throwing the
phone, and it was not done with the intent to deprive the
petitioners.

THE COURT: Therefore, your client will consent to the seizure of his devices?

> MS. BLECHER: I was actually about to raise that. So, Mr. Qin is fine with the -- I am speaking right

now about the -- because he has the two phones. He has his US phone and his Chinese phone. The Chinese phone is the one that was smashed. He does not use that anymore and that can certainly be seized. With respect to his other phone, I don't know that there would necessarily be an objection. As I stated, he is sort of day-by-day reaching out to people to kind of live his life. So I don't know to the extent that it can be turned over this second if he doesn't have arrangements to go somewhere, but I don't think that there would be an objection to arrange for that to happen.

THE COURT: Some time ago you spoke with me about his interactions with his wife, estranged wife, and that because of health issues, and because of perhaps interpersonal difficulties, he did not press to receive documents from her.

Did I understand your statements correctly?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, it's correct that on particular occasions petitioners asked, can you do something right now, and he said right now -- I am not going to talk about her health issues. He named the specific issue and said, for that reason, I had asked her previously, I don't want to ask her right now, I will wait a couple of weeks and try again.

THE COURT: The reason why I am asking is, accepting that there may be health issues and accepting there may be some points of dispute or enmity in their relationship, it would be surprising to me that your client would come to court today

with the very real prospect of getting remanded rather than ask his estranged wife for access to these documents. That's the thing I'm having difficulty understanding. However nice he wants to be, if it is his freedom on the line, why is he not asking her for these materials?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, these statements were made in late April. He has asked her again.

THE COURT: And?

MS. BLECHER: To my knowledge, nothing has materialized.

THE COURT: Is that because they don't exist or because she has decided not to give them to him?

MS. BLECHER: When your Honor says don't exist, for example, we talked about the immigration paperwork. We don't know necessarily whether they are still there or not still there. All that Mr. Qin knows is Ms. Liu handled getting that filed and that she would have it. I think there might be questions as to whether it's still there or not still there, but I don't think that Mr. Qin is in a position to make a definitive statement one way or the other.

THE COURT: And that's troubling to me, because as you have noted just a moment ago, these issues really just flared up in April, and I thought I issued what I called a definitive order on the matter; and yet, not only can you not produce or have not produced these documents, you can't even tell me

today, which is August, whether these documents exist.

I suspect, because my next question to you would be:

Are there additional tax records? Do they exist and they just haven't been produced, or do they not even exist? And with respect to the bank records, are you telling me there are no other bank records at all to produce?

MS. BLECHER: With respect to the texts, Mr. Zhang, who speaks the language, went through to look for relevant messages. And so those, to the extent that they were there, have been produced.

To the extent we are considering this a rolling production --

THE COURT: It shouldn't be a rolling production at this stage of the game. It should have been done long before today.

MS. BLECHER: What I am saying is, if there was a message yesterday that may be responsive to or may have been with one of the individuals they asked about, does that exist, I can't tell you right now.

THE COURT: You may have misheard me. I was asking about tax materials, not texts.

MS. BLECHER: That's my mistake. The tax records,
2020 and 2021 were produced. Mr. Qin had not filed his 2022
tax return as of the time of his deposition. And I did ask Mr.
Qin about this before we came here today, and he said he did

about a week ago file his 2022 return. He requested it from his counsel and we will be providing that to petitioners.

That's the US return.

THE COURT: Are there other returns that he is filing?

MS. BLECHER: I am not aware of any additional

returns, amendments, etc. The outstanding one was 2022 and
that has just recently been filed.

THE COURT: With respect to the bank records, did I understand from your earlier discussions that there are no other bank accounts in which he has any interest, beneficial or otherwise, and therefore there are no additional bank records to produce?

MS. BLECHER: With the exception of the updating of the Cathay Bank records.

THE COURT: Yes, of course. I am trying to understand why there is this argument about him needing to go to China to update records if indeed these accounts were closed more than five years ago.

MS. BLECHER: These accounts were closed. If I remember correctly, it's in 2018 or '19 that the Hong Kong accounts were closed. It coincided with the collapse of his stock value.

There were accounts that were closed earlier. There was one closed at UBS a number of years earlier. The Hong Kong accounts -- Standard Chartered account, JP Morgan Chase

account -- were closed in 2018 or 2019. And the issue is, because they are closed, and because Mr. Qin does not have immediate online access, that he has to request the records for those accounts from the banks. And he tried to have someone contact them electronically, I believe there was a form. He had someone -- I will use the term assistant, but it's someone who helps him in Hong Kong -- I believe Kevin Wong, to go to the bank, can you see if you can get the documents. And it was Kevin Wong who relayed back that they are saying you have to come to Hong Kong to get them. So our understanding is that he cannot get the Hong Kong account records.

THE COURT: Is that in the messages that were produced in this matter? Again, if it's the exchange that I have been looking at, I didn't understand it to say that. I understood Mr. Wong to be saying, it might be easier if Mr. Qin were to go to the physical bank branch in Hong Kong or China to get them. I didn't understand him to be saying that's the only way to get them.

MS. BLECHER: Mr. Qin has phone conversations with Kevin Wong, so it's not necessarily the case that written is the only discussion about the matter. Mr. Qin's understanding, based on what was communicated to him by Kevin Wong, is that he needs to go to Hong Kong to obtain these documents. And the reason why -- your Honor started this entire discussion with what is the position of respondent -- is he has diligently

tried to get these records.

So, with respect to the Hong Kong records, he tried to get them; he was denied access. I believe he has tried to contact the banks directly and not gotten a response. So he just has to rely on what is conveyed back to him by Mr. Wong in Hong Kong.

With respect to the US bank account, the open account, we will supplement. There is a closed account, and he did request the bank records from that account. And, as we explained, we received and produced statements going back five years until the account was closed. We had mentioned in our opposition that that's consistent with requirements in the US, under Bank Secrecy Act laws, to maintain records for five years. But Mr. Qin has no personal knowledge of whether JP Morgan has additional statements somewhere. All that Mr. Qin can say is he reached out to the bank to get statements for this account and the bank provided him with the statements, and all of those were provided to petitioners. And so there is nothing more for him to do in that regard.

THE COURT: I have a couple of sort of overarching questions and one is: What was surprising to me about your opposition was the extent to which you sought to reflect onto petitioners the obligation to obtain certain materials. You suggested that a contempt proceeding could not be brought because, for example, there were other assets that could be

seized or at least inquired into, there were third parties that could be questioned, there were other avenues that could be taken to get the materials, that petitioners could reach out to banks and to the third parties to get the information that your client couldn't produce. And I found that curious because I did not think there was that requirement in contempt law.

What you're telling me today is that your client has done all that he could do. Why then, if that is the case, do you feel compelled to push onto petitioners the obligation for getting these materials?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, it is overarchingly a contempt motion, but there is a request for a specific remedy in there that is not a traditional contempt remedy, it's more a discovery violation remedy, which is what petitioners call adverse findings or adverse inferences. And an important component of that is, if there is not bad faith in the destruction of documents, to what extent there is prejudice to the other side.

And, also, even in the situation where you're dealing with a contempt motion, one of the issues there is it's supposed to remedy some injury, some harm that has accrued to the moving party. That's what the point of contempt is, that there is some harm that has been suffered by the moving party and that some sanction may be appropriate to compel the other party to address that.

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And there was also a request for fees, etc. that all go to the harm that has been there. So one issue that is relevant to that is, if Mr. Qin has during his deposition identified numerous assets, and these are assets that petitioners point to in their moving papers, such as these two cars that are in China and Hong Kong, if they have identified the bank account, they are asking about the Cathay Bank account, why haven't they tried to restrain assets? If they are claiming that denial or the fact that they haven't obtained information about specific assets that they are interested in has prejudiced them, shouldn't there be an indication that they have been taking steps to satisfy their judgment using the assets that have been made available to them?

To go back to the spoliation question, there is this prejudice issue, but there also is this question of you can't have a contempt motion and you can't have spoliation for the failure to produce documents that do not exist. There cannot be an adverse inference for a specific finding unless the movant demonstrates that there is some basis to believe that the evidence existed and that it would have supported the inference that they are looking for.

And in many of these cases, some of these are corporate cases where you have corporate defendants or corporate parties that have very clearcut preservation policies. But some of these are cases where a person testifies

that a certain document exists, and then it hasn't been produced, and then there is a reasonable basis to believe that that document existed and it may have been spoiliated, or to support the finding that the documents that you claim are missing would have supported the finding or the inference that the petitioners are asking for.

If they have not sought discovery from some of these assistants — during Mr. Qin's deposition, he said this person is going to be in New York. He mentioned a couple of people that are in New York. If there is no attempt by the petitioners to get any information from any other party, there seems to be lacking a basis to assert that documents existed and were destroyed, and, also, that the documents we allege were destroyed would have contained information that is favorable to us.

So, there's various reasons why the lack of third-party discovery prevents a spoliation finding, prevents an adverse inference suggestion even if there had been spoliation that occurred. And there is certainly case law, which we cited in our opposition brief, to the effect of, where certain information can be obtained from another party, that a spoliation finding is unwarranted, and also, in some cases, that a contempt finding is unwarranted.

THE COURT: In your opposition, you suggested that petitioners could not ask the Court to draw adverse inferences

post-judgment. In their reply, they provided citations to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and to several cases

indicating that adverse inferences were available

post-judgment. Do you agree with that or do you still contest

that? And that's the legal question, not the factual question,

as to whether they are warranted.

MS. BLECHER: To be clear, the Court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy in both the Rule 37 and the Rule 69 context. And there is not any rule, any statute, any bar, that respondents are aware of, that there could never be an adverse inference in the post-judgment context. The question is whether it's appropriate in this context.

The petitioner cited a number of cases in their reply brief for the proposition that this remedy could be available, and none of those cases involve a situation where a finding of a fraudulent conveyance or a transfer with the intent to hinder or defraud creditors was found in the post-judgment context. They cited a Western District of Virginia case, RLI Insurance Co., and in that case, the court made a finding that, generally, an adverse inference could be available against the debtor in a subsequent future proceeding against the same debtor with respect to the same judgment. In a Northern District of California case, this arises under a special provision of California law that allows a judgment to be amended to add an alter ego debtor to the judgment, and the

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entity that was sought to be added was a party to that proceeding. So in that context, the court found it permissible to draw an adverse inference against a party to the proceeding.

The problem here is that the petitioners are asking for an adverse inference that Mr. Qin transferred property with the intent to defraud creditors. There are a number of factual issues with that claim, but as a legal matter, unlike the California case that they cited, New York law is clear that an action to undo a fraudulent conveyance can only be brought in a separate post-judgment proceeding. That applies to both a fraudulent conveyance and also to assess alter ego liability for a judgment against a judgment creditor. And I can give your Honor a cite, which is Nykool A.B. v. Pacific Fruit, Inc., 2012 WL 1255019, at *5-*8 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). This case itself is actually a report and recommendation, and I mention it because it actually collects New York state law and Second Circuit law all on this topic. It said that remedy that they are seeking ultimately, which is to undo these transfers or assess alter ego liability, needs to be brought against Ms. Liu or against these trusts. It requires a separate defendant who is not a party to this proceeding. But yet they are asking this Court to draw an adverse inference with respect to Mr. Qin. carries no effect with respect to Mr. Qin. It can only be used in a separate proceeding, and it is unclear how they intend to If they need to commence a new proceeding, are they do that.

going to try to collaterally estop Ms. Liu from challenging whether this was a bona fide transfer for value? She is going to say, and she'll be right, that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that fact question in the context of this proceeding.

So, if it serves no purpose in this proceeding, it cannot be simply imported, indeed, it would not be fair to import it into another proceeding in which the other party to the fraudulent transfer was not participating and was not a party. So the reason that we stated in our opposition that it made no sense in this case, it should not be available, is because there literally is no proceeding here where that inference or the finding that they are asking the Court to draw can actually be utilized.

Your Honor, they did make an argument that Mr. Qin is somehow a beneficiary of the fraudulent transfer because he gets to keep the assets for himself. The cases that they cite for that all deal with a provision of the New York's debtor and creditor laws that allow money damages to be awarded against somebody who personally benefits from facilitating a fraudulent transfer. And so those all involve findings against officers or shareholders of a corporation where the corporation was the debtor. They did not cite any cases that stand for the proposition that you can eviscerate this principle that a fraudulent conveyance action needs to be brought against the

transferee. If it were the case that the transferor is also a beneficiary, there would be no need for that rule; it would apply to every single case.

THE COURT: I would ask you to please turn to the chart that I was handed this afternoon at the beginning of the proceeding. If you're able to do so, I would ask you to go through each category and either agree or disagree with the status that is listed.

MS. BLECHER: Number 1, the bank records of Qin, as I stated earlier, there are additional records from Cathay that we will produce. They have also requested bank records of certain entities, etc. and Mr. Qin does not have — he says he is not associated with these entities and doesn't have that information. So I would agree it's partially outstanding with respect to the Cathay Bank statements.

American Express records of Qin and St. Tome -
THE COURT: I can't hear you. I just ask you to be a
little slower and a little louder.

MS. BLECHER: I will just do them by number.

Number 2, Mr. Qin I think tried to get American Express records, but that's overseas and was unable to get them. St. Tome is not an entity that Mr. Qin claims any ownership or control interest in. I believe it's the same entity that paid him maybe the \$4,000 consulting fee that was discussed earlier. So he does not have access to those

documents.

Number 3, Mr. Qin does not have them. So when petitioners say completely outstanding, we don't agree. There is just nothing that he has to produce. He has no recollection of doing anything with respect to a trust in 2009, and did not recognize the particular trusts that were discussed in this litigation and the entities that petitioners are trying to seek alter ego liability for.

Number 4 I addressed earlier. Mr. Qin has continued to ask. For purposes of a contempt motion, he just continues to ask. He cannot make the documents materialize. So it remains outstanding, but it's not especially clear what else Mr. Qin can do.

Number 5 is partially outstanding because he has recently filed his 2022 return and that will be provided to petitioners.

The schedule of assets, this is a claim that petitioners make. They simply accuse Mr. Qin of fabricating a document.

THE COURT: That document with one asset, that's the schedule of assets?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, the document was provided by Ms. Liu to Mr. Qin. It is Mr. Qin's understanding and recollection that the only asset transferred, owned by King Fane, was that property, and that he transferred that share as

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part of the divorce agreement. So he has turned over what was provided to him. It's not inconsistent with his recollection of what was --

THE COURT: He recalled three or four pages. He gave one thing.

MS. BLECHER: Mr. Oin seemed to have a practice of asking people to simply tell him what is in a document that is not written in a language that he understands. The document was in English. He had someone speaking English reading it for him. He does not know, looking at the English version, this is the contract and this part is the schedule of assets. testified that the document was three or four pages. Petitioners kept asking him about the schedule and he said three or four pages. He said he could not understand what it said because it was in English. But he said the document was about three or four pages, the document that was produced with the schedule of assets is about three or four pages. is not an inconsistency there. Petitioners want to keep interpreting what he said as meaning that the schedule itself was three or four pages. It was not in a language he can understand when he saw that document, and he would not be in a position to be able to distinguish between the body of the document and the schedule.

With respect to number 6, he has produced what was given to him. I don't know that he can represent this is the

actual schedule. What he can represent is this is what was provided to him by a counterparty of that agreement.

Number 7, Mr. Qin is going to be producing his most recent tax returns, so that seems to fall under this topic.

He has testified regarding his consulting agreement or arrangements that he tried to enter into.

THE COURT: The consulting agreement was oral, there is no written documentation of it?

MS. BLECHER: The St. Tome agreement is the subject of a separate line item here, number 8. The consulting agreement with St. Tome, there was a written consulting agreement that is a document that, to Mr. Qin's best recollection, was placed into storage in a storage unit in Hong Kong; and then when SMI failed to pay the bill, because it had no more money, the storage unit disposed of everything that was in the unit.

THE COURT: I didn't quite understand that. Where is the storage unit?

MS. BLECHER: In Hong Kong.

THE COURT: And there were no efforts to pay whatever debt there was to the storage unit so they wouldn't take and destroy what was in it?

MS. BLECHER: The storage unit was SMI's unit. The company was stripped of its assets. I am not sure if there was anyone sitting around who cared at that point from SMI. It's subject to numerous claims from creditors. It was stripped of

its actual revenue-producing assets. So it does not appear to be the case that there was an SMI representative that wanted to pay that bill.

As far as Mr. Qin, I don't know that he was aware that the agreement was being put into a storage unit that was an SMI storage unit. I think his understanding was it was just being put somewhere for safekeeping, and then he subsequently learned it was in an SMI unit and that the unit's contents had been disposed of because SMI had not paid the bill. So it's outstanding, but I am not aware there is any agreement for Mr. Qin to produce because his understanding is it's been disposed of by the storage unit.

The agreement is with a company St. Tome, with which Ms. Liu has an affiliation. He also identified two individuals in Hong Kong that are, I believe, directors, that they have some affiliation with it. So it's possible that there is a third party that has another copy of the agreement. Mr. Qin no longer has his copy.

THE COURT: Mr. Qin no longer has his copy?

MS. BLECHER: Of the consulting agreement.

THE COURT: Does not or does?

MS. BLECHER: Does not.

THE COURT: So that's the answer to number 8.

MS. BLECHER: That's number 8, your Honor.

THE COURT: When he is receiving money from St. Tome,

is it a direct deposit? Is there any sort of indication as to why he is receiving \$4,000 a month? Are there credit card bills attendant to the credit card that seem to be related with the company that he may have overspent on that resulted in the deduction of funds?

MS. BLECHER: The credit card is a company credit card and Mr. Qin is supposed to use it for company expenses. I believe he did testify during his deposition that he may have used it on one or two occasions to stay at a hotel on a night when he did not have somewhere to stay. But it is a company card. He said he does not get the bills. Presumably, the bills go to the company. I can't answer that question affirmatively, your Honor. I just know he does not get those bills. But if the company gets them, it would make sense that the company would deduct from any payments being made to him, whatever the balance is on those cards.

THE COURT: Number 9.

MS. BLECHER: Mr. Qin, he did testify he used to own a plane and a boat. He bought them around 2017 or 2018 when he did have a lot of money. There was some confusion on the last day of Mr. Qin's deposition, but he did testify that he had disposed of these assets because, again, when SMI collapsed, he had a lot of creditors coming at him and he had no more money.

This is specific to the watercraft or the aircraft. He does have two cars in Beijing. I don't believe he has any

records associated with those to produce. The cars are there.

I believe he invited the petitioners to go and get them, if
they want them, but he doesn't have documents to give them
about those two cars.

With respect to the boat and the plane, he says he does not have any documentation regarding the sale, that it was somehow used to satisfy a debt that was -- petitioners are not the only creditors that have come to Mr. Qin's door in the wake of the collapse of his company. And my understanding is the boat and the plane were used to satisfy some other creditor obligation.

THE COURT: And the Rolls Royce is here in the States?

MS. BLECHER: There are a few cars in the States, your

Honor, and Mr. Qin is not an owner of them. The Rolls Royce,

he referred to it as a company car. I believe the company is

St. Tome.

THE COURT: This is the company in which his wife has an interest?

MS. BLECHER: His wife does have an interest in that company.

THE COURT: Is there someone other than his wife who has an interest in this company?

MS. BLECHER: He identified two specific individuals in Hong Kong who also had an interest. He also identified a man named Frank who had a former interest. Yong Zhang was one

of the people. I forget the name of the other individual. He said there were three people that he would talk to about St.

Tome. And there used to be someone named Frank who has since left the company.

The Rolls Royce is the company car. Then there is a Benz Jeep that Mr. Qin says belongs to his younger brother, who is a movie producer, and apparently has residences and cars scattered around. But he does keep a car in the city, he keeps a car in New York. And Mr. Qin does drive it on occasion, but he does not own the car and does not have records regarding the Benz Jeep. Mr. Qin does not have any other vehicles. He did testify that he will occasionally borrow a car from a friend, but he does not own any vehicles in New York or in the US. He has the two cars that are in — one in Beijing and one in Hong Kong.

I can move on to number 11, but to be honest, I'm not really sure --

THE COURT: I am at number 10.

MS. BLECHER: Given that the following real property is not identified on the chart, I don't recall specifically which of the properties this is referring to.

THE COURT: I'm imagining it's the Applegreen property and the Plaza Penthouse.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, Mr. Qin has been consistent in stating that he did not ever own the Plaza apartments, that

those were purchased by Ms. Liu or some entity affiliated with Ms. Liu. He does not claim to live there. He stated that he has stayed there on occasion, that he will reach out and get permission to stay. He does not keep clothes there. He does not have any documents to provide regarding the Plaza 2003 or Plaza 2009.

35 Applegreen he has no knowledge of at all. It's unclear what that property even is. He is only aware of an address at 39 Applegreen.

With respect to 39 Applegreen, he provided the deed of gift that concerned the BVI entity that owned that property, as well as a property transfer tax form associated with that transaction, which I believe is in 2018. He does not have anything else that qualifies as a lease agreement. It's not his property. He transferred it in 2018 to Ms. Liu's mother pursuant to their divorce decree. So there is nothing else that Mr. Qin has to produce.

THE COURT: And the Rector Place property? Was it 377 Rector?

MS. BLECHER: 377 Rector Place is owned by another Mr. Han, who is a friend of Mr. Qin, and he stays with him sometimes. I believe he has used it maybe to receive mail at some point. He does not own that property.

THE COURT: He is in the City of New York right now. Where is he staying tonight?

MS. BLECHER: I don't think I have asked him where he is staying tonight. He did say that he spent last night at the 84th Street, the Upper East Side address. The one associated with Mr. Cao, I believe is the -- with Boss Cao. I can't answer.

THE COURT: All right.

There is nothing to give for number 11.

MS. BLECHER: I am not even sure I understand what number 11 is asking for. So I am going to say there is nothing to give for number 11.

THE COURT: Number 12.

MS. BLECHER: Number 12, Mr. Qin testified he does not own any of these properties. He does not have any records regarding the property tax, at least any time in the past five years. He did previously own some of these properties. I don't think he still has any records from that time, but I believe he produced some public records he was able to dig up, because he was trying to be helpful, even though public records are not the most helpful things to produce. He has nothing to produce on property taxes because he doesn't own the properties and doesn't pay the taxes on them.

Number 13, Mr. Qin has produced the messages that he identified. He did testify that he generally communicates via --

THE COURT: I think you may be misunderstanding me. I

am asking you to either agree or disagree with the status that is given. If, for example, more things have been produced than they say have been produced, please tell me. If they have accurately identified what has been produced, tell me.

MS. BLECHER: I think it's accurate the items that have been produced in response to 13. We obviously disagree with the contention that it's incomplete. He went through and identified the text messages and those are what he had. To the extent there may have been some in the past, he said he normally does this by phone, those no longer exist. And so there is not anything additional to produce. Again, as I mentioned earlier, if there is a new message from yesterday, maybe that exists. But as far as, there was an order, Mr. Qin went through to find responsive information, that's what he found, and there is nothing else to add to that.

It's the same thing for number 14. If there were not communications produced, it's because Mr. Qin did not have text communications. He may have communicated by phone, but he did not have anything responsive, any communications with Frank or Ren Hongqi. And it is correct that there were screenshots produced showing communications with Han. And I believe there were some screenshots of a check that Huang Binjun had written to pay some of Qin's Amex bills. I believe that was in WeChat as well.

Number 15, their note I believe is accurate. Given

that Mr. Han and Huang Binjun are in 15 as well, it's the sam
messages that are referenced in 14. So their description is
accurate and Mr. Qin does not have additional WeChat messages
with those individuals.

Number 16, their note is accurate. Mr. Qin does not have a copy of this document. I think he tried in the past to get a copy of the document and has not been successful, but he does not have a copy to provide.

And number 17, their note is accurate. Mr. Qin does not have any documents from the FBI. He testified that he was shown, I think, the warrant, but it was never given to him, and he doesn't have any other documents related to that FBI raid.

THE COURT: When was the last time your client went to Beijing or any part of China?

MS. BLECHER: I don't know if I am in a position to answer that question.

THE COURT: I am sure there is someone at the table who is.

MS. BLECHER: I'm saying I may need to phone a friend.

THE DEFENDANT: So, your Honor, last time I went to China was the Chinese New Year, according to the lunar calendar, January 3, 2020, according to the lunar calendar.

THE COURT: January 3, 2020.

THE DEFENDANT: According to the Chinese calendar. Roughly, around February 3, 2020.

THE COURT: February 3rd of 2020.

Is there a different answer if the question is when was the last time he went to Hong Kong?

THE DEFENDANT: I went there February 3, 2020, and three days later, roughly, on February 6, 2020, I fly back to New York.

THE COURT: Ms. Blecher, you have indicated to me earlier that petitioners, you believe, have not met their burden of demonstrating a basis for me to find either spoliation or the factual predicate that would permit an adverse inference. In connection with this proceeding, I received, and I believe Ms. Lee included it as an exhibit, an appendix 3 of proposed adverse inferences. It includes both a requested adverse inference for the missing or destroyed documents and the information that the missing or destroyed documents would contain.

Now, I don't believe you have actually contested any of these. So you have told me in sort of a broad-brush fashion that they have not demonstrated it, but they have put this together. So I don't know whether what you're saying is everything here is wrong, or you're accepting for purposes of this argument that what is contained in this appendix is correct, but it is insufficient, or something else.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor is correct that we did not prepare a similar appendix going bullet point by bullet point

in response, because a lot of these actually repeat the same language over and over again. We did address it more generally in the body of the brief, which is to say that, certainly, if there is a document that is missing, we are not contesting that. The issue is there is no basis to assume that the document existed and was destroyed or withheld.

And then in the third column, the enumeration that missing or destroyed documents would contain, the bullet points generally contain very speculative and tenuous connections. The first one, Ali Weng is Qin's assistant and as his assistant would participate and know about Qin's major financial transactions, we have already discussed the use of the word assistant does not mean —

THE COURT: I am not accepting your use of the word assistant. So I am actually accepting the petitioners' use of the word assistant.

MS. BLECHER: It's not my use, but that's what Mr. Qin, as a factual matter, has testified, is that these people are not his assistants.

Nevertheless, the mere fact that somebody has assisted him on a particular occasion, with respect to a particular item, does not naturally lead to the conclusion that, if there are no chats with this person, that therefore there must have been chats and those chats must have contained messages that indicate that a transfer that took place — the first one is 16

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Hickory Drive, that was transferred to his sister, I believe, back in 2011 or 2012 initially.

So, they are asking the Court to find that transfers that happened years before -- there was even an underlying dispute in the arbitration -- were made to defraud creditors that could not even be contemplated at that time. It doesn't make sense as a factual matter. It's not legally a fraudulent You can't act with intent to defraud a creditor that transfer. doesn't exist. And the idea that because somebody -- even accepting, which we did not, that assistant means assistant, assistants help with all sorts of things. It's wildly speculative and overbroad to draw a conclusion that the absence of communication with a particular person who has assisted Mr. Qin on a different occasion would be documents demonstrating that this specific property and the transfer of this specific property was done with fraudulent intent. There is no direct connection between the relationships they purport to draw.

In the second bullet, it says that Ali Weng helped arrange places for Mr. Qin to stay and would therefore be aware of changes in Qin's housing situation. How does that lead to a conclusion that Mr. Weng would have documents that indicate that a transfer of property from years ago was made with the fraudulent intent to prevent creditors from reaching them. There is no natural connection between helping somebody find a place to stay and having intimate knowledge as to the purpose

of a transfer of a specific piece of property.

The third bullet is the same. Ali Weng deals with Qin's personal matters and therefore would have been involved in Qin's transactions regarding 16 Hickory Drive.

These are wildly overbroad and speculative conclusions that they are asking the Court to draw. And in order to get an adverse inference instruction, the movant has to demonstrate that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the documents that were not produced, had they been produced, would have supported the inference that they are asking the Court to draw. And similar language goes throughout this document.

THE COURT: I will just note for petitioners that I think your adverse inference number 4 might be missing a few words. Because mine ends, it just speaks of purported transfers of funds. Perhaps you meant to say "were made with fraudulent intent," but I don't have that.

Ms. Blecher, are you telling me that detaining your client as a matter of coercive contempt would not be fruitful because your client has no more documents to produce, could not find any more documents to produce, there is just nothing else there, other than those very limited categories of things that you spoke to me today about, including tax returns and a couple of more current Cathay Bank records? You're telling me as an officer of the court that there is nothing else out there?

MS. BLECHER: I am telling your Honor based on his

representations --

THE COURT: I want you to put yourself out there.

It's not enough for me to put your client. I guess I don't know how good of a job you did at communicating with your client the significance of this. Because I am considering very seriously detaining him, but you're going to tell me, as a coercive measure, it won't result in the production of additional documents because you say there are no additional documents to produce.

MS. BLECHER: Mr. Qin wants to comply with the Court's order, and he has taken reasonably diligent steps to try and do that. He wants to do that. And as part of that process, he has reached out and tried to obtain documents that he does not have because he generally just doesn't have a history of keeping good records of his business dealings. So he has reached out to third parties to try and get documents, and what he has been able to get is what he has produced.

To the extent that he is able to get anything else, it would be nothing more than a matter of fortuity that something else materializes, because he has made all the effort that he can make to try to get these materials. And so incarceration would not serve the purpose of compelling further compliance because it's not possible for him to do any more than just repeating the same things that he has already done.

THE COURT: So when he says, "I will never pay. Even

if you shoot me dead right now or you lock me up in jail or you put me in jail, I will not," I should not worry about that? It just seems to me like contempt.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, Mr. Qin made certain statements --

THE COURT: Under oath at his deposition.

MS. BLECHER: He also made statements under oath at his deposition that if the marshals showed up at his house to take assets, that he would gladly turn them over and that he would respect the law. He was asked specific questions by petitioners' counsel about whether he understood that he was required to comply and to turn over assets, and he specifically asked petitioners, why are we even wasting time with these questions when they could just come and take the assets? He is not going to disobey an order, and he was not intending to convey -- I believe he even said on the record at one point that when he used the phrase "shoot me," he understood people were not interpreting it the way he meant it.

THE COURT: And when he videotaped himself burning money?

MS. BLECHER: My understanding is he is not the one in the videotape burning the money, but he did have a videotape of it. And the background of that is that there was an associate that was in town, and he had given money for the Chinese Lunar New Year to, I believe it was General Lui, and General Lui

returned the money and the money was in Mr. Qin's apartment. And General Lui was later accused of some kind of bribery, or something along those lines, and Mr. Qin was afraid that the money in his home in an envelope that had General Lui's name on it would constitute evidence that could be used against Mr. Lui improperly, even though it was just supposed to be a Chinese Lunar New Year gift. So he asked somebody to burn the money.

The point Mr. Qin was making in that colloquy is there was a broader conversation regarding how the size of a transaction that your Honor or I might think is relatively large is small to him, and he was commenting on, I don't care about money, I have burned money to protect my family. That was the point.

THE COURT: There is a disconnect, though, between your current representations to me that your client has no assets and has fallen on hard times and your statement just a moment ago that he conceives of transactions in numbers larger than we can think of and therefore it was not a big deal to him to burn that money. I don't think there is a way you can reconcile that.

MS. BLECHER: I am not sure that I can, your Honor. Mr. Qin used to be very wealthy and operates in a different headspace than a lot of other people.

THE COURT: I don't think it justifies his discovery productions in this case.

I am going to take a break. I will see you all in about 15 minutes. Thank you very much.

(Recess)

THE COURT: I know I kept you here longer. I will hear from the folks at the front table if they wish to say anything briefly in reply.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, if you so permit, I will allow my colleague to respond to a couple of the legal points.

THE COURT: That will be Mr. Smith.

MR. SANT: Yes, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, we had referenced a proposed order. I don't know if you're interested in seeing it.

THE COURT: You can show it to me and to the others.

I don't know that I am signing any orders this evening. We will talk about that.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I just wanted to address, as Mr. Sant mentioned, a couple of legal points, with respect to the two major remedies that we are seeking today, adverse inference as well as incarceration until he purges his contempt.

With respect to incarceration, what we have heard today and what you have heard through our papers is very similar to Schwarz v. ThinkStrategy Capital Management. That's a July 1, 2015 Southern District decision in which the defendant there was civilly incarcerated. And the facts there

are very similar, and they have been alluded to earlier in this case. And that's where the Court found that the defendant offered only a fanciful tale of unparalleled charity and generosity by his friends. And what the facts were there are very similar as to here. There, there was a Porsche that the defendant said was merely a company car. Here we have heard that the Rolls Royce that he drives around in is a company car of St. Tome. Of course, St. Tome is the entity that his wife created and is the entity that he has a credit card for. By the way, we have not received any of those credit card records.

THE COURT: It's because he says he doesn't have access to them because it's the company of other people.

MR. SMITH: Exactly. Again, it's what he says versus reality.

So, the *Schwarz* decision also said that, quote-unquote, loans received from family and friends in an amount of approximately \$720,000 over the course of approximately three years was unbelievable. Here, we have records that have been produced from the Schwed firm as well as Seiden Law, and they have been paid over a million dollars in legal fees, and those fees come from --

THE COURT: Sir, could you repeat the sentence? I heard you, but I didn't hear you fully.

MR. SMITH: The point that I am making, just to tee it up a bit more clearly, is that in the *Schwarz* case they found

unbelievable over a period of close to three years receiving, quote-unquote, loans from friends and family to cover expenses totaling approximately \$720,000. Here, we have documentary evidence that he has received, either he has characterized it as loans from various entities or friends to cover over a million dollars in legal fees to the Schwed firm and Seiden Law. So we believe that that is also evidence that he has no money to be unbelievable.

THE COURT: According to the deposition, who paid these legal fees, friends?

MR. SMITH: Not just in his deposition. We actually subpoenaed the firms. So they have to give us the records.

So, the most recent records we received from Seiden Law in June show one transfer from China, and this was for a little over \$40,000; another was from Singapore for \$20,000; and one that was from the West Coast, from California, for \$30,000. And these are entities that we have not actually known about prior to receiving these documents.

THE COURT: Although you will excuse my math, but that gets you \$90,000. You're saying there's a million dollars in legal fees.

MR. SMITH: That is correct. As between those two firms. I happen to have these, in terms of the location of them, where they get these funds.

In our meet-and-confer with respect to discovery

responses from Seiden Law specifically, when asked if there are any other documents with respect to the source of these assets, do you have communications from either your client Qin or from the entities themselves where this money is coming from or does it just show up, apparently it just shows up. They had no other documents. We have the wire transfers they produced to us.

THE COURT: Ms. Blecher, who is paying these fees?

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Are you telling me that's privileged information?

MS. BLECHER: Not at all, your Honor. I think some of it might be above my pay grade.

THE COURT: Whoever at the table can tell me, can tell me.

MS. BLECHER: I am aware of certain of the entities that paid that have been discussed at depositions and what those are. I don't know if there is additional information that can be provided. On the whole, Mr. Qin, again, as I stated earlier, has to ask people to help him pay for certain expenses, borrow money.

THE COURT: It's one thing to sleep on someone's couch for the night, and something else to have them pay a million dollars in legal fees. How many entities are paying the fees for this case?

1 Mr. Zhang. MR. ZHANG: I do believe we received approximately, in 2 3 toto, approximately 200K or a little more. Say that again. 4 THE COURT: 5 MR. ZHANG: 200,000 or a little bit more on this case. 6 We have an outstanding bill we produced as well. We have 7 outstanding 440,000 unpaid invoice. Outstanding 440,000. But you have gotten 8 THE COURT: 9 200,000 paid, sir? 10 MR. ZHANG: That's my best recollection. 11 THE COURT: From whom, sir? 12 MR. ZHANG: As petitioner indicated, a wire transfer 13 with a note, attorney's fees for Qin. So we collect it into 14 account against Mr. Qin's unpaid invoice. 15 THE COURT: Do you not know where that money is coming from? 16 17 MR. ZHANG: I do recall there was one payment came from St. Fortune Group. And I do recall, as petitioner point 18 19 out, two payment from Hong Kong and Singapore with the 20 comments, payment for Mr. Qin's attorney's fees. 21 THE COURT: And you're not sure where it's coming 22 from? 23 MR. ZHANG: We could only identify payer's name and 24 bank account, and we have produced it to petitioners.

THE COURT: St. Fortune is the company that's

1	controlled by his estranged wife's father, yes?
2	MR. ZHANG: St. Fortune was controlled by two
3	individuals, Mr. Qin's ex-wife and Mr. Qin's ex-wife's father.
4	THE COURT: Family members.
5	I am just saying, not that I have ever been divorced,
6	but I can't imagine, if I were, that my former husband, which I
7	have difficulty even saying, would be paying a million dollars
8	of my legal fees.
9	MR. ZHANG: Only payment we received from Mr. Qin's
10	ex-wife or ex-wife's father is that 50K from St. Fortune.
11	THE COURT: Sir, I am not sure why Mr. Kushner finds
12	this funny and is laughing, but he'll tell me at some later
13	point.
14	Sir, you're \$440,000 in the hole and you're still
15	continuing to represent him.
16	MR. ZHANG: Yes. Because this case already been here.
17	Ethically we can't drop him off at this moment.
18	THE COURT: Interesting.
19	Mr. Smith, please continue.
20	MR. SMITH: The million dollar figure includes the
21	amount that the Schwed firm has been paid as well.
22	THE COURT: I understand, sir. I don't have them
23	here.
24	MR. SMITH: That's correct.

So, I just wanted to point that out with respect to

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our motion for contempt. We think it is appropriate here. We think that he needs to be incarcerated until he can purge his contempt, particularly with respect to getting documents, but also at least paying, he can pay his lawyers; he has been ordered to pay our fees as well.

With respect to adverse inferences, Ms. Blecher also said that those are not available here, and she referenced one of the cases that petitioners cite in their papers, the recently decided July 2022 case out of the Western District of Virginia, the RLI Insurance Company v. Nexus Services. fact, that case has similar facts to this case as well. a defendant that had failed to comply with two post-judgment discovery orders. And in that case, the counsel came forward and said, I'm sorry, we just haven't gotten to producing some documents, it's not a priority, and they were producing a little bit of documents. But what the judgment creditors wanted were historical documents to figure out where the money That's the words that counsel used in that case. had gone. They said, We are here today to figure out how they were treating companies, how they were making transfers during this period, to figure out where all this money went, that they were collecting for years and then squirreling away, so that we can pull it back in the litigation. They hadn't produced any of The court there found it appropriate in the those documents. post-judgment context to make an adverse inference. And there,

the adverse inference was much broader than any of the inferences that we were seeking in our moving papers. And it was characterized dismissively by counsel for Qin but, in fact, they made a finding there that they were entitled to an inference that such discovery that had not been provided would have been adverse to any defenses raised by the defendants there in any litigation related to collection on the judgment.

And that's what we are attempting to do here. And that's why I thought it would be helpful to provide you with the proposed order here because, really, we were trying to be more specific than we need to be. What we simply want is an adverse inference that in future enforcement litigation any inferences should be drawn against Qin when he has destroyed evidence or withheld evidence.

So, in paragraph 5 of the proposed order, you will see that, putting aside whether it is a fraudulent transfer, these transfers were sham transactions, with respect to King Fane, St. Tome, and PH 2003 Unit LLC, and St. Grand Ceremony LLC.

THE COURT: What counsel was saying --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SMITH: We have no evidence to actually tie that --

THE COURT: Let me finish.

What counsel was saying was that it made no sense because, at the time the transfers were taking place, he did not know who these creditors would be; they hadn't yet become

creditors.

MR. SMITH: Perhaps in some cases, but not in the case of the penthouses. In the case of the penthouse, that was purchased using a \$27 million loan by Luxury Team Inc. and PH 2003 Unit LLC, which we believe to be Qin's entities. The address for them were at the Applegreen Drive address. And in Ms. Liu's responses to the discovery requests, she identified various entities that she formed and she controlled. And these two particular, she said they were created for the purpose of purchasing properties, but she didn't say that she created or owned them. So we believe it to be Qin.

However, on March 28, 2001, the loans were transferred over --

THE COURT: May I hear the date again?

MR. SMITH: March 28, 2021, the loans were transferred over to St. Grand Ceremony LLC, which in fact is an entity that Ms. Liu, Qin's estranged wife, owns. And that date is significant because on 4/21/2021, the arbitration award in this case was entered. So within a week there was a massive transfer of equity in the Penthouse Plazas. And the loan guarantors there were Ms. Liu, and then JP Morgan Chase Trust as a trustee of the GLE Trust, which we believe is another one of the trusts that were set up to divert assets from Mr. Qin to avoid his creditors, including our clients.

And this is just an example. There's a lot of

evidence that supports the inference. But we are not asking for a declaratory judgment against even Mr. Qin. We are asking for an adverse finding that, in absence of documents that he should have and that he should have produced, or that he in fact destroyed, all inferences should be made against him.

Now, to Ms. Blecher's point, in any future litigation in which we attempt to apply these adverse inferences, we are not asking for anybody to come in to be precluded from that. So the question of whether or not there is an offensive non-mutual issue preclusion --

THE COURT: That is my concern.

MR. SMITH: -- will depend on what excuse the entities give in the subsequent litigation. And we are not asking you to decide that. She is asking you to decide that. She is saying, well, in any future litigation it will be meaningless. But we are not asking for a determination of any future litigation. We are asking for a factual finding that, in the absence of any evidence being produced, which he should have and that has been destroyed here, that an inference should be drawn against Qin.

Now, if an entity comes in, or if Ms. Liu comes in, that's a presumption. They can rebut that presumption. But that's why it's helpful and important to us. Because there must be some remedy for the violation of this Court's orders. He can't just destroy evidence or withhold evidence or the real

nature of these type of transactions.

By the way, a \$27 million mortgage taken out initially by these two entities, the amount of money that you have to have shown a bank, but that was before the bank transferred the mortgage over to an entity controlled by Ms. Liu.

So, clearly, there is money there. And this gets to one of the early points that Ms. Blecher made. It was in response to --

THE COURT: I believe it's Blee-cher, sir.

MR. SMITH: I apologize.

-- how is your client living? And her overarching response, before both of you drilled down a bit, she said that he had fallen on hard times; that he had a lot of money, but now he doesn't anymore. Well, if that were the case, where did the money go? We want to know where the money went. He didn't just go from having a lot of money to having no records of that. We are asking for the last five years. The last five years covers when he had a lot of money.

So, in fact, if he had bank accounts, they were drained to pay assets to creditors, he doesn't have them, or they were transferred in some manner, which he can say was legitimate, as gifts or anything else, that's fine. The problem is they don't have any answer to that. They just said he has fallen on hard times and we don't know where the money went. He sold an airplane. That's not where a billion dollars

went.

So I just wanted to touch on those two specific points with respect to the remedies. And my colleague, Mr. Sant, wanted to address just a couple of the factual issues as well, if you would indulge us.

THE COURT: Briefly.

MR. SANT: Your Honor, if any of these you don't need to hear information about because you're satisfied, I will be happy to skip them.

The first point that Ms. Blecher raised was that there was some kind of unawareness of the issue about the ongoing Cathay Bank statements. I just wanted to highlight, in our reply on page 3 we write, "Qin produced no" -- and it's underlined and in italics -- "Cathay statements for the past seven months despite demand from petitioners."

Then in the attached Lee declaration, paragraph 5 states, "Qin has only produced his Cathay Bank records through November 2022." And it goes on.

THE COURT: She indicated that was an oversight.

MR. SANT: It seems hard to imagine how somebody could read the brief and not see that, but I will move on to the next one.

We heard that his only active bank account allegedly had 500, now has a few thousand, that he hasn't used in a long time, which raises the question again, how does he live? It

doesn't make any sense.

He claimed that he used some of the funds that came in to pay off certain credit cards. Again, no credit cards have been produced.

THE COURT: Again, I am not saying I agree with this, or I accept this, but what was said to us was that there was a corporate credit card of St. Tome, and he just doesn't get the bills for it. Which is, indeed, a great credit card to have, if you can spend and not get the bills.

MR. SANT: I would love to have that credit card. It sounds like it has amazing features.

I would note that he claimed to have received this payment from some kind of agreement ending his consultancy. That seems to be the same St. Tome consultancy.

THE COURT: Yes. You have not seen this agreement?

MR. SANT: No. It hasn't been produced.

THE COURT: He says he doesn't have his copy of it.

MR. SANT: He doesn't have the original St. Tome agreement, which he first said he sent to Singapore. Then he said he did have one in the United States but he didn't have space for it. But then he sent it to a storage unit in Hong Kong, and then it was destroyed. And now, somehow he has an agreement paying him money to end this consulting agreement, yet he can't get a copy of the actual consulting agreement? And this is a company run by his wife who he lives with, and

it's not on any computer where they can print it out? I will move on.

Standard Chartered. He claims that he can't get these records that are in Hong Kong. I would just direct the Court's attention to our reply in support of the motion to compel. It is exhibit 3 to the Lee declaration. The e-mail here from Standard Chartered is not asking him to come to Hong Kong.

THE COURT: The Lee declaration or the Lee reply declaration?

MR. SANT: It's the reply declaration. It's exhibit 3.

THE COURT: I am looking at it now.

MR. SANT: And there's other ones. This was just an example. But this is an example from Standard Chartered Hong Kong, and one can see that it comes from Therise Chan, Standard Chartered Hong Kong. And it says you can get access just by doing a chat with a live agent feature over the internet. There is no demand here to come to Hong Kong.

So, we heard about the deletions, and the argument was that he didn't delete anything of note. I would direct the Court's attention to deposition transcript page 383, line 9, to 384, line 22, in which Qin testified that he "deleted most" contacts and communications when he "hired Seiden Law" in May or June 2022, and he "deleted a lot of things on WeChat then."

Again, we subpoenaed Seiden Law seeking any litigation

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holds ever sent to Qin and none were produced. We don't believe he ever received one.

I will move on to the next topic. I guess there is nothing to say here because opposing counsel agrees there is no bar to adverse inferences in the post-judgment context.

In terms of the contradictory testimony, I will just direct your attention to footnote 2 to our reply brief. We provide a whole bunch of examples of inconsistent and contradictory testimony, none of which was contested.

THE COURT: What footnote?

MR. SANT: It is footnote 2 on page 2 to our reply brief. We gave examples including -- it's just amazing, your Honor.

"I do know St. Fortune." "I don't know. I have never heard of it."

It's all a series of statements.

"Sometimes I use Uber." "I don't even know how to call Uber."

"I don't travel." "I have not traveled."

Here is an ellipsis. "I take my children to the summer camp in Geneva every year."

THE COURT: I see.

MR. SANT: I will move on.

I will skip this point. I think it's not necessary to make it.

I heard some argument that maybe the three to four pages was a reference to the entire length of the transcript. We quoted at length this segment of the deposition testimony. We would simply direct the Court's attention to our original motion to compel, page 17. I won't read it for your Honor, except for the beginning it says, "How many pages was the attachment?" And it goes on and on. So this was an instance where he was asked three to four times just to make sure we are talking about the attachment here. And he keeps saying, yeah, the attachment. It's just not believable that he somehow thought it was the entire document.

I will skip again this one.

We heard that opposing counsel did not disagree with any information on the chart, which shows he has not complied with this Court's orders.

Regarding his travel back and forth to China. He was questioned about this during his deposition. He did not say anything about, I'm afraid of China, I got out of China. What he said was he left because of the pandemic. He said he left on the final day of the lockdown. He was told that the lockdown was coming and the final day he got out. And this is on page 105 of his deposition transcript.

His testimony a moment ago, whether it was accidental or intentional, it was incorrect in his testimony, he said that he was still in China in March. He just testified his last

time was in February. Perhaps that was an accident and he misremembered.

I heard that you can't draw an adverse inference about his assistant Ali knowing what homes he has, because why would he know that just because he arranges places to stay. Your Honor, the person who helps you arrange places to stay probably knows what homes you have. I am not sure why that person would not know. But in addition to that, Ali also handles Qin's tax returns and other financial information. Mr. Qin testified that he would send this information to Ali by WeChat. And, of course, all those records are gone.

I believe your Honor has already assessed Mr. Qin's credibility through question and answer, but we certainly invite the Court to ask any further questions that the Court may feel is necessary to assess his credibility. We would love to understand why it is that he has no records that predate this Court's April 18 order other than a couple of holiday messages from December. All the other messages are after this Court's order requiring him to produce communications.

If this Court would indulge me for a moment, I will just say what I think is really happening, your Honor. I think Qin is still married. I think that he has papered over some transactions, but these are all shams. He is transferring his assets to his mother-in-law and his wife, and that's why he refuses to produce all these records because he knows what they

will show. This is also why he doesn't produce his immigration records because it shows he is married.

THE COURT: Did he not say in his deposition that he was sort of maintaining the facade of the marriage for immigration purposes?

MR. SANT: I believe he confessed to it. Not only that. He confessed that he wanted to continue doing this.

In our original motion to compel, your Honor, we excerpted, and I won't read it for your Honor, but we excerpted a portion of Ms. Lee's deposition of Mr. Qin, where effectively she says:

"Did you tell the truth in your tax return?

"Yes.

"And your tax return says you live at 39 Applegreen Drive?

"Yes.

"And that's the truth, isn't it?

"No."

I don't know how to respond to that. This is what we have had for the entire length of his deposition, is this kind of self-contradictory answers that make no sense.

I would just like to make one final point and then I will sit down, your Honor. I heard about the burning money, that this was allegedly done because it could constitute evidence, and so they burned the money because somebody could

misinterpret that cash because it had General Lui's name on the envelope.

Your Honor, you can just burn the envelope. This doesn't make any sense. And if you want to get rid of evidence, why are you filming yourself doing it, and then you're sending this video back and forth by the very phone messages that you claim the CCP is looking at. It doesn't make any sense. Nothing he says can be trusted. Again, I simply invite the Court to --

THE COURT: I need you to tone down the drama.

MR. SANT: In any case, I said that was my last comment. I will stick by my word. Thank you.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I apologize.

THE COURT: I do want you to come to an end.

MR. SMITH: This will be an end. It was just an oversight. I handed you the proposed order, but then never really referenced it. I won't go through it. Most of the pertinent information has been covered. The one thing that we do add there for your consideration is assistance by the US marshals to actually go to these premises where he said that he stays and where he has identified that he has property, and potentially records, to go in and seize any electronic devices, that he may not have brought to the court today, for imaging. And then also, in addition to that, various financial papers or records that we may see there that could be responsive to our

production. We have added some language there, protection, in case we had something that is not Mr. Qin's and we would videotape. That's one protection that we have added there, in anticipation of objections to going into those properties and seeking those items.

So we respectfully request that relief as well.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Smith, let me please understand something. Am I correct, and the answer may very well be no, am I correct that there is not perfect consistency between the adverse inferences that are requested in appendix 3 and the adverse inferences contained in paragraph 5 of your proposed order?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SMITH: That is correct. We thought we would simplify them.

THE COURT: You aim low.

MR. SMITH: This addresses the potential criticism that we got from Ms. Blecher that specific adverse inferences with respect to specific causes of action may be improper.

Really, here, we are saying that, absent documents showing that these transactions were legitimate, they should be deemed sham transactions. Again, obviously subject to, in any subsequent litigation which we would be applying those adverse findings, subject to rebuttal by any other party.

With respect to (c), that's specific to the evidence that we are trying to find with respect to trusts, and we do

believe or we hope that we will be successful in identifying some of those trusts, either through evidence compelled from Mr. Qin or his estranged wife. We say there "or money had and received," in parentheses, which is essentially the common law equivalent of constructive trust. You have heard about BVI entities. So if we needed to enforce these inferences in foreign jurisdictions, that's just an explanation about language that was not in other papers.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Counsel at the front table, do you believe there is a dispute between the parties as to the legal standards for the imposition of sanctions, the circumstances under which I can find contempt and the circumstances under which an adverse inference can be drawn?

And I will ask the question a little more pointedly, and then I will ask Ms. Blecher at the back table. I have law here. Do you wish me to read it into the record or do the parties agree with what the legal standards are for the imposition of sanctions for contempt and for an adverse inference? I gave all of those in my April decision. So I don't think I need to give it again.

MR. SMITH: Petitioners certainly waive any necessity to read into the record the standards. We certainly agree with the Court's articulation.

THE COURT: Ms. Blecher.

(212) 805-0300

MS. BLECHER: I think the parties are in agreement as to the overall standard for each of these specific cases. If one element is not present for what would be required in that circumstance we might disagree on, but overall, what the Court needs to find I think we are in agreement.

THE COURT: This is not a complete decision. But based on everything I have heard today, and based on the materials I have received, I largely reject the explanations given to me by respondent and his counsel for what has happened. And I do believe that he has not abided by my orders. He has willfully not abided by my orders. He has done everything possible to avoid abiding by my orders. And he has lied to me and he has lied at his deposition. So I do find that there are violations of my prior discovery orders, and I also find that he is contempt. And the issue then is, what are the sanctions available to me?

I do intend to find certain adverse inferences. We can do it whether we call them inferences or facts. I was looking at what was in appendix 3. I agree with Ms. Blecher that it is not entirely clear to me that each one of those is something that I can find at this stage and on this record.

So I am going to take that component of my decision under advisement and figure out which of the things that are now sought in the proposed order are things where I can find not only that there is contempt or a discovery violation, but

where the appropriate sanction is the adverse inference that is requested in paragraph 5 of the proposed order. So that is something that is still under consideration.

The issue of remand is very much a live issue. But for several reasons, including the lateness of the hour, I am not going to remand Mr. Qin at this time. But I am still thinking about it. I have not decided against it. I just want to have an opportunity to look at everything that has been given to me.

I am going to ask the parties to do certain things. I am going to ask petitioners' counsel to e-mail the proposed order to chambers so that I can work with it and modify it if need be. I am going to ask respondent to obtain a copy of this transcript on an expedited basis. And by expedited, I am not saying tonight or tomorrow, but within a week or two, so that I can have it with me and work with it.

There is an issue that was addressed earlier. It was an issue about producing tax returns and additional bank records that have come to light. I imagine that will be done within a week.

Then there is the issue about devices. My understanding is that Mr. Qin has a device here in the courthouse somewhere, but something tells me I don't have it up with me. And to be clear, whatever that device is is going to the gentleman in the gallery for imaging tonight. And I

presume as well, because you have already agreed to do so, that what is known as the Chinese phone will also be produced to the gentleman in the gallery from Setec Investigations.

MS. BLECHER: Your Honor, I am sorry to interrupt. I believe that phone is actually down with the marshals.

THE COURT: Let me ask these questions.

Mr. Zhang, I thought I understood from conversations you had with my deputy that you have his current phone. Did you misspeak?

MR. ZHANG: I misspoke. I don't have his current phone.

THE COURT: You have the former phone, which is in my hand, which I can turn over to the gentleman from Setec for his imaging. And understand that you all, those in the back table, will be responsible for giving him the information that he needs to access this. So I hope your client remembers the password that was used for this phone. I am allowing you to make arrangements with Mr. Setec to retrieve the phone whenever it is appropriate.

Where is his current phone, sir?

MR. ZHANG: I don't have the answer to that.

THE COURT: Talk to your client and tell me.

THE DEFENDANT: Because I was informed before I came here that I cannot take my phone in with me, so I left my phone with theirs.

1	MR. ZHANG: It's not in my office.
2	THE COURT: Would you chat with your colleagues and
3	figure out where this phone is right now. And someone report
4	back to me where the phone is. Thank you.
5	Mr. Zhang, I am quite confused because my deputy has a
6	firm recollection of you saying you kept his phone in your bag.
7	MR. ZHANG: I think I misspoke. I just had that phone
8	with me today.
9	THE COURT: You have no bag with you now?
10	MR. ZHANG: No.
11	THE COURT: Having consulted with your colleagues,
12	where is Mr. Qin's phone?
13	MR. ZHANG: He said it's highly likely he put it in
14	the conference room in the firm. Because we did tell him that
15	the court does prohibit him to bring a phone unless he has
16	attorney license or permitted by the Court.
17	THE COURT: It is your belief that it is somewhere in
18	your office?
19	MR. ZHANG: Somewhere in our firm.
20	THE COURT: Where are your physical offices, sir?
21	MR. ZHANG: My office is 322 Eighth Avenue.
22	THE COURT: I guess I am confused. If you advised
23	your client you couldn't bring phones, why did you bring this
24	phone?
25	MS. BLECHER: Mr. Qin was in our office before we came

here, and he said separately on the way or when we were walking, Oh, I want to give you this phone to have, and we did not then take it and put it away. So that kind of came here with us.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Smith, the gentleman from Setec is named what, please?

MR. KYPRIANOU: Tino Kyprianou, T-i-n-o, K-y-p-r-i-a-n-o-u.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Kyprianou, let me please understand the process by which this phone is imaged. You will be speaking with the folks at respondent's counsel table to get information about the password, and you will be explaining to them, I imagine, that there will be something done to the password to prevent someone from remoting in while you're doing your work?

MR. KYPRIANOU: We have to put it on airplane mode and take it off WiFi.

THE COURT: How long does the imaging process take?

MR. KYPRIANOU: It all depends what kind of phone it is and how much information is in there. If it's an Android phone, it might take five, six hours. If it's an iPhone, it might take less.

THE COURT: I believe it to be an iPhone.

MR. KYPRIANOU: It might take, maybe, two or three

hours.

THE COURT: Sir, does someone have the ability to accompany respondent's counsel to their office to pick up the other phone?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SMITH: Absolutely. And we would go with Mr. Kyprianou.

THE COURT: So that will be this evening. I will let you all figure out who draws the short or long straw to accompany him back to the office.

I am going to hand the phone to my deputy so that you can all see me hand it to Mr. Kyprianou.

MR. KYPRIANOU: Can we take it back to our lab and do it?

THE COURT: You can take it back to your lab, sir. I want you to have both phones in your possession this evening.

MR. SMITH: Also, I understand your Honor's order to be directing respondent to provide Mr. Kyprianou with all necessary passwords, access codes?

THE COURT: Yes. All of those things. It's not worth it for him to have the device if he can't access it.

That's enough for one evening.

MR. KYPRIANOU: We can have the password here, but if there are any messages on the iCloud, then we need the password for that as well to access the iCloud.

THE COURT: I would expect that the iCloud passwords

1	will be given in addition to the password to access the phone.
2	Thank you everyone for your time, which has been quite
3	extensive this afternoon. You will hear from me going forward.
4	Thank you.
5	(Adjourned)
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